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I. INTRODUCTION
College athletics, perhaps even more so than professional
sports, engender a high degree of affinity and attachment.  Boost-
ers and alumni are willing to give millions to further the cause of
their alma mater.  Several schools1 welcome over one hundred
thousand spectators from all over the country to a single home foot-
ball game on autumn Saturdays.2  College football’s 2014 (and last)
Bowl Championship Series (“BCS”) National Championship game
garnered some of the highest ratings in cable history.3  Every
1. Throughout this Article, we use the terms “school,” “college” and “univer-
sity” interchangeably to represent institutions of higher learning.
2. See generally 2012 National College Football Attendance, NCAA, http://fs.ncaa
.org/Docs/stats/football_records/Attendance/2012.pdf (listing attendance statis-
tics for all NCAA Men’s varsity football teams for 2012 season).  Over 37 million
attended Division I FBS football games in 2012. See id.  Michigan led the national
average with 112,252 per game. See id.
3. See Michael Humes, College Football Generates Record Audiences, ESPN
MEDIAZONE  (Jan. 10, 2014), http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-releases/2014/
01/college-football-generates-record-audiences/ (providing increased audience
statistics as game became “third most viewed cable program ever”).
2
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March, economists estimate hundreds of millions of dollars in pro-
ductivity is lost due to Madness.4
The position of Athletic Director is perhaps the most prestigi-
ous in all of college athletics.  It is, in a sense, the general manager
of a portfolio of sports teams that potentially represents the univer-
sity in front of millions of spectators.  However, the duties and re-
sponsibilities of an Athletic Director are very different from its
professional counterpart.  Instead of reporting to a team president
or owner, the Athletic Director answers to the university president,
chancellor, or board of directors (or governors).  The teams do not
belong to a professional sport league, but instead are part of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”).  NCAA ama-
teurism rules (for now)5 require that student-athletes are not paid,
and therefore Athletic Directors primarily concern themselves with
issues such as compliance, fundraising, and coaching contract deci-
sions, in lieu of salary caps, player contract negotiations, drafts, and
free agency.
The purpose of this Article is to study how the constitution of
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”)6 Athletic Directors has
changed over the last twenty years.  The revenues associated with
college football and men’s basketball have increased as those sports
have become more popular.7  Given the rising stakes and increasing
pressure to perform, many industry professionals believe that there
is a conscience movement away from the traditional exercise of hir-
ing ex-coaches as Athletic Directors toward a preference for individ-
uals with a strong business background or previous Athletic
Director experience.  In support, many cite that the compensation
package for top Athletic Directors has become commensurate with
business executives who deal with tens or hundreds of millions in
revenue.  For example, Vanderbilt Athletic Director David Williams
4. See generally Caroline Fairchild, March Madness Watchers To Cost Businesses
$134 Million In Just The First Two Days: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/17/march-madness-at-work_n_2868016
.html (providing estimations of how much economic productivity is lost due to
March Madness).
5. For a discussion on the possibility of changes to NCAA amateurism rules,
see infra Section III(A)(i): Student-Athlete Compensation and Rights of Publicity.
6. See infra Sections II (A)-(B) and accompanying footnotes for a discussion of
the significance of the FBS designation.  This distinction is further discussed in
Section II.A of the NCAA MANUAL infra note 13.
7. See generally Revenues & Expenses 2004-2012, NCAA Division I Intercollegi-
ate Athletics Programs Report, NCAA, available at https://www.ncaapublications
.com/p-4306-revenues-and-expenses-2004-2012-ncaa-division-i-intercollegiate-ath-
letics-programs-report.aspx (discussing increasing revenues in college sports such
as football and basketball).
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was the highest paid Athletic Director in 2013, earning over $3.2
million.8  In all, nine Athletic Directors that year posted earnings
over $1 million.9
To study whether this hypothesized tendency toward business
experience is accurate and to identify other trends in the data, we
gathered as much information as possible on the Athletic Directors
of the 120 FBS institutions during the 1989-1990, 1999-2000, and
2011-2012 school years.10  The information was gathered using a
variety of sources, including colleges and universities’ news articles
and media guides.
This Article is comprised of four sections.  The first section de-
scribes the environment in which Athletic Directors operate in or-
der to better understand their job responsibilities.  In so doing, we
attempt to briefly elucidate the operation of the NCAA and the ath-
letic departments of universities.  The second section explains the
numerous duties of a college Athletic Director framed in the con-
text of the difficult legal issues covering those duties.  The third
section examines the data we collected and analyzed, giving particu-
lar attention to collegiate playing and coaching experience, past
Athletic Director experience, business background, education, age,
and gender and race.  This data is then compared among the three
samples taken over the twenty-year window.  The final section,
termed “Career Tracks,” draws conclusions on what paths recent
Athletic Directors have taken to reach their positions.
II. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
Before discussing the athletic department and, more specifi-
cally, the Athletic Director, it is important to first understand the
unique environment in which athletic departments operate.  The
NCAA consists of over 1,200 member institutions and is designed to
oversee the intercollegiate competition between colleges and uni-
8. See generally Athletic Director Salary Database, USA TODAY, March 6, 2013,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/03/06/athletic-
director-salary-database-methodology/1968783/ (evidencing that David Williams,
Vanderbilt Athletic Director, was highest paid in 2013).
9. See id. (identifying nine Athletic Directors that earned more than $1 mil-
lion in 2013). The following nine Athletic Directors earned over $1 million: David
Williams (Vanderbilt) $3.2M; Tom Jurich (Louisville) $1.4M; Steve Patterson
(Texas) $1.4M; Jeremy Foley (Florida) $1.2M; Barry Alvarez (Wisconsin) $1.2M;
Shawn Eichorst (Nebraska) $1.1M; DeLoss Dodds (Texas) $1.1M; Gene Smith
(Ohio State) $1.0M; Jack Swarbrick (Notre Dame) $1.0M; Joe Castiglione
(Oklahoma) $1.0M. See id.
10. In the 1989-90 season, 106 schools played Division 1-A football; in the
1999-2000 season, 114 schools played Division 1-A football; and, in 2011, 120
schools played FBS football.
4
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versities across the United States.11  Founded in 1906, there are now
more than 400,000 student-athletes participating in 23 sports, all of
them fighting for one of 89 championships.12  According to the
NCAA Division I Manual, the NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational pro-
gram and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by
so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports.”13  The NCAA divides its member-
ship into three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division III.
Division I is further divided based on certain criteria.
A. Division I Membership Structure
Division I is the highest division in the NCAA divisional struc-
ture.  The division itself is divided into three subdivisions based on
a school’s football team: Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”, previ-
ously Division I-A), Football Championship Subdivision (“FCS”, pre-
viously Division I-AA), and Division I (often referred to as “Division
I without football”, previously I-AAA).  As of 2013, there were 123
FBS members, 126 FCS members, and 97 Division I members.14
Most of the schools in Division I are considered to be among the
larger universities in the United States.  Sixty-six percent of Division
I institutions are public; the remaining thirty four percent of Divi-
sion I institutions are private.15
A school must meet a set of minimum requirements in order to
qualify as a Division I institution.  An institution must offer at least
14 sports (including a minimum six for men and seven for women),
sponsor a minimum of two team sports for each gender, and have
11. See Who We Are, Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-
are/membership (last visited March 9, 2015) (providing brief historical overview
of NCAA).
12. See id. (explaining that three-division structure provides more opportuni-
ties for student athletes).
13. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013-2014 NCAA DIVISION I MAN-
UAL, art. 1.3.1, NCAA, [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www
.ncaapublications.com/p-4322-2013-2014-ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx (highlight-
ing NCAA purpose and goals and providing schools with operational and adminis-
trative bylaws).
14. See NCAA Members by Division, NCAA, available at http://web1.ncaa.org/
onlineDir/exec2/divisionListing (last visited February 15, 2014) (listing NCAA
membership statistics in 2013).
15. Compare Steve Berkowitz, Most NCAA Division I Athletic Departments Take
Subsiding, USA TODAY, July 1, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/col-
lege/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/ (stating there are 228 public
Division I institutions). See also Members by Division, supra note 14 (listing all 346 R
Division I institutions).
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at least one sport in each season (fall, winter, and spring).16  In
order for a sponsored sport to be counted against one of the four-
teen required sports, it must meet the minimum contests and par-
ticipants requirement unique to each sport.17  For example, the
soccer team must play a minimum of eleven contests, while the indi-
vidual sport of golf must have at least eight contests and at least five
participants.18
Division I also has financial aid limitations and requirements
that set it apart from the other Divisions.  Each sport has a maxi-
mum number of scholarships, known as “grants-in-aid,” it is allowed
to provide to student-athletes.19  The NCAA divides sports into
“head-count” sports and “equivalency” sports.  In head-count sports,
student-athletes receiving grants-in-aid are counted against the
maximum if they receive any aid, regardless if it is full or partial.20
For example, women’s tennis is a head-count sport, and a maxi-
mum of eight student-athletes can receive aid.21  In equivalency
sports, only what a student-athlete receives is counted toward the
grants-in-aid limitation.22  For example, men’s soccer is an
equivalency sport with a maximum value of 9.9 financial aid
awards.23  Thus, the value of 9.9 scholarships could theoretically be
spread across all eighteen or so members of the soccer team.
It also bears mentioning that recent events have set the stage
for further division among NCAA member institutions.  In August
2014, the NCAA Board of Directors approved a plan that would
provide a degree of autonomy for college sports’ five largest and
most powerful conferences: the Southeastern Conference, ACC,
Big 12, Big Ten and Pacific-12.24  Moving forward, the five confer-
16. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 20.9 (providing detailed R
description of specific requirements necessary for Division I membership).
17. See id. art. 20.9.6.3 (listing minimum requirements for sports
sponsorship).
18. See id. (providing specific requirements for given sports).
19. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 15.5 (listing various R
schemes and requirements for grants-in-aid per sports).
20. See id. art. 15.5.9.1.1.2 (defining how grants-in-aid are counted).
21. See id. art. 15.5.2.1 (listing specific head-count maximums for different
sports).
22. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 15.5.3.2 (providing infor- R
mation on how financial aid is computed in equivalency sports).  The actual com-
putation of financial aid in equivalency sports is slightly more complicated than
this.  Briefly, what a student-athlete receives in aid is divided by cost of a full grant.
The fractions are then summed, and the sum must not exceed the limit provided
for each sport listed in article 15.5.3.1 of the NCAA Manual.
23. See id. art. 15.5.3.1.1 (listing equivalency values of various men’s sports).
24. See Kent Babb, NCAA Board of Directors Approves Autonomy for ‘Big Five’ Con-
ference Schools, WASH. POST, Aug 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
6
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ences will be able to propose rules, which will govern only them.  A
new 80-member panel, including 15 current players, was created to
vote on the big five’s proposed rule changes.  To pass a rule re-
quires either a 60 percent majority of the 80-member panel plus
three of the five power conferences or a simple majority plus four
of the five leagues.25  The increased autonomy is likely to provide
the five conferences with the authority to provide more stipends
and insurance benefits to student-athletes, increase staff sizes,
lessen recruiting restrictions, and increase the number of permitted
hours of practice.26  The policy change was a clear sign that the big
five conferences, with their dominating football teams and large tel-
evision contracts, are competing on a different level than the other
Division I members.
1. FCS Versus FBS27
FBS and FCS schools must meet additional requirements above
those minimum requirements set forth for Division I membership.
FCS schools are required to sponsor at least 14 varsity intercollegi-
ate sports, including a minimum of seven women’s sports and six
men’s sports.28  Most importantly as compared to the basic Division
I requirements, FCS schools are required to have a football team,29
and that football team must play more than half of its football
games against FCS or FBS teams.30
FBS institutions are required to sponsor at least 16 varsity inter-
collegiate sports (including football) with a minimum of six men’s
sports and eight women’s sports.31  Furthermore, FBS member in-
colleges/ncaa-board-of-directors-approves-autonomy-for-big-5-conference-schools/
2014/08/07/807882b4-1e58-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html (discussing plan
of NCAA Board of Directors to provide autonomy for five largest and most power-
ful sports conferences).
25. See Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN, Aug. 8,
2014, http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-
allow-autonomy-five-power-conferences (discussing how Big Five Conferences can
impact NCAA changes going forward).
26. See id. (providing how this new autonomy will benefit conferences).
27. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 20.9.9 (describing R
additional requirements for FBS and FCS schools in addition to Division I
requirements).
28. See id. art. 20.9.10.1 (providing minimum sponsorship requirements).
29. See id. art. 20.9.10.1. (listing requirements for FCS members).  FCS Mem-
bers are required to have a football team.  Further, this football team must play
more than half of its games against FBS and FCS members.
30. See id. art. 20.9.10.2 (providing minimum game requirements for FCS and
FBS members).
31. See id. art. 20.9.9.1 (defining minimum requirements to sponsor teams).
7
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stitutions must annually offer at least 200 athletics grants-in-aid or
spend at least $4 million on athletics grants-in-aid.32
Most of the other rules differentiating FCS versus FBS schools
predictably apply specifically to football.  For instance, an FBS
school must play at least 60 percent of its football games against
other FBS member institutions.33  There is also a requirement that
the institution average at least 15,000 in “actual or paid attendance”
over a two year rolling period for all home football games.34  Fi-
nally, FBS member institutions must provide an average of at least
90 percent of the permissible maximum football grants-in-aid dur-
ing a rolling two-year period.35
B. Financial Implications of FBS Versus FCS and No Football
While the structure and administration highlights some differ-
ences among the Division I subdivisions, the most notable differ-
ence between Division I subdivisions are the football programs and
the revenue and expenses they generate.  The finances of major
Division I athletic departments have long been contentious issues in
college athletics.36  Some critics cite the amount of revenues gener-
ated by the NCAA and large college programs to support their ar-
gument that student-athletes should be better compensated for
their efforts.37  Others cite the deficit under which most athletic
programs operate to argue against the inclusion of the athletic de-
partment as part of the university experience.38
32. See id. art. 20.9.9.4 (outlining additional financial aid requirements).
33. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 20.9.9.2 (providing requirement R
that FBS members must play at least sixty percent of their games against other FBS
institutions). However, the Division I NCAA bylaws do permit for a FBS member
institution to count one contest against an FCS member to satisfy the scheduling
requirement, “provided the Football Championship Subdivision opponent has av-
eraged 90 percent of the permissible maximum number of grants-in-aid per year in
football over a rolling two-year period.” See id. art. 20.9.9.2.1.
34. See id. art. 20.9.9.3 (outlining how NCAA counts attendance and differen-
tiates between actual and paid attendance).
35. See id. art. 20.9.9.4 (expanding upon NCAA financial aid requirements).
36. See generally MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE
SPORTS IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION (2000) (discussing contentious
issues surrounding Division I sports and their financials).
37. See Michael Wilbon, College Athletes Deserve to be Paid, ESPN (July 18, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6778847/college-athletes-deserve-
paid (providing discussion of one contentious issue, whether college athletes
should be compensated as college sports bring in significant revenue).
38. See generally PETER A. FRENCH, ETHICS AND COLLEGE SPORTS: ETHICS,
SPORTS, AND THE UNIVERSITY (2004) (discussing common argument that university
athletic department is not part of educational experience).
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1. FBS Financials
The FBS consists of the largest revenue generating athletic de-
partments in the NCAA, generating median revenues of nearly
$41.9 million in 2013.39  This number has been on the rise; median
revenues increased over 37% from 2008.40  The median generated
revenue for men’s sports in 2013 was $31.3 million, whereas the
media revenue for women’s sport was only $1.2 million.41  The ath-
letic department, which generated the most revenue in 2013, re-
ported over $165 million.42
NCAA and conference distributions are the largest source of
generated revenue for FBS institutions, bringing in over $10.4 mil-
lion (24.8% of generated revenues).  Other major sources of reve-
nue include ticket sales ($8.8 million/21.0%), contributions from
donors and alumni ($8.7 million/20.8%), and royalties, advertis-
ing, and sponsorships ($3.4 million/8.0%).43  The average football
team generates $20.3 million in revenue (48.4% of revenues) while
the average men’s basketball team generates $5.6 million
(13.3%).44
However, expenses have been on the rise at the same time.
Median total expenses were $62.2 million in 2013, up over 50%
since 2008’s level of $41.4 million.45  The median FBS athletic de-
partment expended $11.6 million more than it brought in (not in-
cluding institutional funds) in 2013.46  In fact, in 2013, only 20 of
the 125 FBS university athletic departments generated revenues
that exceeded their expenses.47  There is also a large discrepancy in
39. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004-2013, 20
(2014) [hereinafter NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES], available at http://www
.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1REVEXP2013.pdf (providing sum-
mary fiscal information for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013).  “Generated reve-
nues” do not include revenues allocated to the athletic department by the
university.  “Total revenues” include allocated revenues.
40. See id. (illustrating that 2008 median generated revenues for men’s and
women’s sports was $30,494,000).
41. See id. at 24 (listing comparisons of media generated revenue for men’s
and women’s sports).
42. See id. at 20 (showing largest generated revenue of 2013).
43. See id. at 30 (describing sources of revenue for college athletics).
44. See NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES, supra note 39, at 37 (illustrating that R
men’s football generates more revenue, on average, than men’s basketball).
45. See id. at 21 (showing rising expenses associated with college athletics).
46. See id. at 24 (illustrating that Athletic Departments expend more than they
earn in generated revenue).
47. See id. at 13 (illustrating that in only twenty cases did generated revenue
exceed expenses).  It is important to note that generated revenue is revenue that is
generated solely by the operations of the athletic department and does not include
revenues otherwise received from the university. See id. at 9.
9
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the expenses of men’s and women’s sports.  The median Division I
FBS university spent $24.8 million on men and $10 million on wo-
men.48  However, much of this can be traced to expenses relating to
the football program; an average of $15.3 million was spent on foot-
ball alone in 2013.49  Men’s basketball saw another $5.2 million in
expenses.50
The largest expenditure category for an athletic department is
the university paid salaries and benefits of the personnel, with a
median expense of $20.7 million.51  These salaries account for over
33% of all athletic department expenses.  Other single areas of ma-
jor expense include grants-in-aid at $8.7 million (14.0%), facilities
maintenance and rental ($5.5 million/8.9%), and team travel ($4.0
million/6.4%).52
2. Division I FCS and Division I Without Football
There is a stark difference when comparing the financials of
FBS schools to those of FCS schools.  For example, in 2013, the
median generated revenue of FCS schools was $3.79 million, only
9% of what the median FBS school generated.53  Even the largest
FCS revenue generating institution brought in only $23.3 million,
approximately $18.5 million less than the revenues of the median
FBS school.54
48. See id. at 24 (comparing university expenditures on men’s sports with wo-
men’s sports).
49. See NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES, supra note 39, at 27 (evidencing that R
differences between expenditures on men’s and women’s sports revolve around
football).
50. See id. (evidencing that another difference is expenditures on men’s bas-
ketball programs).
51. See id. at 32 (illustrating that salaries of university personnel also contrib-
ute to expenditures on collegiate athletics).
52. See id. at 32-33 (showing other expenditures that collegiate athletic pro-
grams face).
53. Compare NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES, supra note 39, at 49, with id. at 24 R
(evidencing stark difference between finances of FBS and FCS programs). See also
id. at 17-22 (providing side-by-side comparison and summary of FBS and FCS gen-
erated revenues and expenses from 2004-2013).
54. See NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES, supra note 39, at 49 (showing that FCS R
schools generate less in revenue than FBS schools).  Football at the FCS level gen-
erates a median of $955,000 per school.  See id. at 52 (providing average revenues
for FCS institutions).  Furthermore, the median total expenses for FCS athletic
departments were about $14.5 million, or 387% of generated revenues.  See id. at
49 (illustrating that Football at FCS institutions brings in much less in revenue
than schools spend in expenditures).  The expenses incurred by football were by
far the largest at $3.0 million, followed by $1.3 million for men’s basketball.  See id.
at 62 (illustrating most expenditures of FCS institutions are due to costs of
football).
10
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Division I schools without football show an even greater dispar-
ity in their finances.  The median revenue generation of such
schools was $2.4 million in 2013.55  These schools almost certainly
do not operate at a profit.  Even without having to deal with the
high cost of a football team, median expenses at a Division I univer-
sity without a football team are over $14 million.56  Many Division I
schools without football have filled the gap with hockey, another
high-expense sport, at a median cost of $2.3 million in 2013.57
Men’s basketball came in a close second at $1.9 million in average
expenses.58
These numbers suggest that FCS and non-football Division I
programs are not intended to be, and likely cannot be, self-sus-
taining.  The lack of revenue generation coupled with still relatively
high expenses makes self-sustenance impractical.  The major reve-
nue-generating sports of football and men’s basketball in these two
subdivisions do not generate enough revenue to cover the sports’
own expenses in many instances, let alone supplement other parts
of the athletic department.  Instead, FCS and Division I schools
without football rely heavily on allocated revenues from the univer-
sity and other sources to operate the athletic department.
III. THE DUTIES OF A DIVISION I ATHLETIC DIRECTOR AND
RELATED LEGAL ISSUES
College athletics is big business.  The NCAA received $871.6
million in revenue for the 2011-12 academic year.59  Moreover, the
100 highest revenue producing athletic programs averaged approx-
imately $59,361,468 in revenues during the 2012-13 academic year
and thirteen programs brought in more than $100 million in reve-
nue.60  Athletic Directors’ duties are closely tied to generating and
55. See NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES, supra note 39, at 75 (illustrating aver- R
age revenues of Division I schools without football).
56. See id. (showing that even without football teams, Division I schools still
generate many expenses).
57. See id. at 88 (providing explanation as to how Division I schools can gener-
ate expenses without football teams).
58. See id. (providing further evidence that schools without football teams can
generate large expenses).
59. See Revenue, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/rev-
enue (last visited February 15, 2014) (providing information regarding NCAA
profits).
60. See Steve Berkowitz, Christopher Schnaars & Jodi Upton, College Finances,
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances (last vis-
ited Mar. 9 2015) (crediting Malcolm Moran, Cory Collins, Megan Filipowski, Pa-
tricia Foley, Autumn Grayson, Cate Grider, Alec Johnson, Sam King, Jon
LaFollette, Tian Liang, Daniel McFadin, Nicholas Moyle, Manny Randhawa, Greg
11
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protecting these revenues.  Yet, organizations of any kind certainly
are not able to produce such high revenues without its share of
concomitant legal issues.  The most important aspects of an Ath-
letic Director’s job and the related legal issues include: the NCAA
and compliance; conference issues and responsibilities; university
rules, regulations and responsibilities; compliance with Title IX;61
and, negotiating contracts.  We discuss each area in turn.
A. NCAA Issues and Compliance
Maintaining and ensuring compliance with NCAA Bylaws is
perhaps an Athletic Director’s most important responsibility.  The
NCAA’s Division I Manual of rules and regulations is notoriously
thick: 417 pages separated into 33 Articles.62  There are hundreds,
if not thousands, of individual rules that, although designed to en-
sure fairness and to protect the tenets of amateurism, can also come
across as silly and counterintuitive.  NCAA Bylaws understandably
prohibit offering cash and other gifts as an inducement to enroll,63
but also prohibit member institutions from contacting prospective
student-athletes via text message (unless they play basketball),64
and declares student-athletes ineligible if they ever played on a
team with a professional player, even if they were never
compensated.65
It is essential that athletic departments have a strong compli-
ance department.  Almost all, if not all, member institutions have a
compliance department, which consists of a team of individuals
whose everyday mission and task is to ensure that the institution’s
athletic department, teams, coaches, and student-athletes comply
with NCAA Bylaws.  The compliance department is responsible to
ensure each step of a student-athlete’s journey into, through, and
out of the university is NCAA-compliant.  This includes making sure
the student-athlete is eligible, that the school recruited the athlete
Rappaport, Jazmin Reid & Madison Warfel of Indiana University’s National Sports
Journalism Center) (providing data to calculate revenue of university athletic
programs).
61. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88
(evidencing that schools must provide students with equal opportunities for partic-
ipation in sports).
62. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13 (listing NCAA bylaws, rules and R
regulations).
63. See id. art. 13.2 (evidencing that schools may not offer cash or gifts as an
inducement to enroll).
64. See id. arts. 13.4.1.2-13.4.2.1 (evidencing that schools may not contact pro-
spective athletes via text message).
65. See id. art. 12.2.3.2 (illustrating that playing on teams with professional
athletes can disqualify NCAA participation).
12
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appropriately, that the student-athlete remains academically eligi-
ble, does not accept impermissible benefits, practices and plays in
accordance with NCAA Bylaws, and then, if possible, transitions
into professional sports without jeopardizing his or her eligibility
and the school’s standing in the process.
Former Auburn quarterback Cam Newton is an illustrative ex-
ample.  Coming out of high school in Atlanta, Georgia in 2007,
Newton was one of the top-ranked college football recruits and at-
tracted the attention of many of the top programs in the country.66
Considering the competitiveness with which Newton was recruited,
an Athletic Director and compliance personnel would have paid
special attention to the number of visits Newton made to the uni-
versity,67 the nature of the visits, the frequency and timing with
which the football team staff contacted Newton,68 the nature and
date of the scholarship offer,69 and Newton’s academic standing.70
66. See Cameron Newton, RIVALS.COM, http://rivals.yahoo.com/footballrecruit-
ing/football/recruiting/player-Cameron-Newton-41356  (last visited Mar. 9, 2015)
(discussing Cam Newton’s high school career and his prospects).
67. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 13.6.2.1 (providing rule on official R
visit limitations).  NCAA Bylaws strictly limit a prospective student-athlete to one
“official” visit; see also id. art. 13.02.16.1 (evidencing that “official visits” are visits “to
a member institution by a prospective student-athlete. . . financed in whole or in
part by the member institution”). See also id. art.13.7.1 (evidencing that prospec-
tive student-athletes can take unlimited “unofficial visits”); id. art. 13.02.16.2 (illus-
trating that if universities provide anything of value greater than $100 to visiting
student-athletes, visits becomes “official.”).
68. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 13 (discussing several rules con- R
cerning the type and amount of contacts permitted).  For example, generally, off-
campus recruiting contacts cannot be made before July 1 following the completion
of the prospective student-athlete’s junior year in high school. See id. art. 13.1.1.1.
“In football, one telephone call to an individual . . . may be made from April 15
through May 31 of the individual’s junior year in high school.” Id. art. 13.1.3.1.2.
During a prospective student-athlete’s senior year, the school is permitted to make
one telephone call per week. See id. art. 13.1.3.1.  Each sport has its own specific
calendar controlling when the school can contact prospective student-athletes. See
id. art. 13.17.  Lastly, while school officials are permitted to send emails and facsim-
iles to prospective student-athletes, they are prohibited from sending text
messages. See id. art. 13.4.1.2.
69. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, arts. 15.1, 15.02.2 (discussing nature R
and dates of scholarship offers). Financial aid is limited to the “cost of attend-
ance,” defined as “an amount calculated by an institutional financial aid office,
using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition, fees, room and
board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses related to attend-
ance at the institution.” Id. art. 15.02.2.  An institution cannot offer a scholarship
until August 1 of a prospective student-athlete’s senior year in high school. See id.
art. 13.9.2.2.
70. See id. art. 14.3 (detailing academic requirements for freshman student-
athletes); see also id. art. 14.3.1.1.2 (charting initial-eligibility based on combination
of GPA and SAT or ACT score).
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Newton ultimately chose to enroll at the University of Florida, the
defending national champions.
Newton’s journey through the NCAA process was only begin-
ning however.  In the fall of 2008, Newton was arrested for the theft
of a laptop computer from another Florida student.71  While NCAA
Bylaws do not proscribe penalties from criminal conduct by stu-
dent-athletes, the NCAA Bylaws dictate that all student-athletes and
persons associated with athletic departments are to act ethically.72
After Florida suspended Newton, Newton decided to transfer.
Although he was poised to become a big-time college football
player, Newton could not transfer to another Division I institution
without sitting out one year.73  Newton instead chose to transfer to
Blinn College, a junior college in Brenham, Texas governed not by
the NCAA, but instead by the National Junior College Athletic Asso-
ciation (“NJCAA”).  Newton played only one season at Blinn and
led the school to the 2009 NJCAA National Football Championship,
throwing for 2,833 yards and 22 touchdowns (and rushing for 16
more) in 12 games.74
One year removed from his Florida departure, Newton was
once again eligible to play NCAA Division I football.  Newton was
again recruited by the college football powerhouses, and ultimately
chose to sign with Auburn University.  Newton’s transfer from a jun-
ior college came with its own subset of NCAA Bylaws, including that
he had spent at least one full-time semester at the junior college
and that he had earned a grade point average of at least 2.0.75
Newton’s biggest NCAA challenge yet came at Auburn.
Newton’s Auburn career got off to a roaring start when he ac-
counted for five touchdowns and 357 yards in a September 4, 2010
71. See Florida’s Newton Faces Felony Counts After Fellow Student’s Laptop Stolen,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=
3718266 (discussing charges that Newton faced after fellow student’s laptop was
stolen).
72. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 10.1 (providing evidence R
that Cam Newton’s criminal charges violated NCAA bylaws because NCAA restrict
unethical conduct).
73. See id. art. 14.5.1 (illustrating requirement that students whom wish to
transfer to another institution cannot transfer without sitting out one season).
74. See Blinn College Football, Statistics: Cameron Newton, NAT’L JR. COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.njcaa.org/colleges_college_player.cfm?category=
vstats&sid=11&divid=0&slid=5&collegeId=1687&teamid=92308&athleteid=270689
&seasonselect=459 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (illustrating Cam Newton’s statistics
while playing for Blinn College).
75. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 14.5.4.1 (illustrating that Cam R
Newton could not transfer from Blinn College to NCAA institution without com-
plying with additional NCAA bylaws).
14
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win over Arkansas State.76  While Newton and Auburn’s stellar play
continued on the field, speculation of improper recruiting prac-
tices swirled off it.  In early November 2010, several Mississippi State
University athletic boosters claimed that Cecil Newton, Cam’s fa-
ther, sought a cash payment of between $100,000 and $180,000 to
secure Cam’s transfer from Blinn to Mississippi State.77
Weeks earlier, the NCAA’s enforcement staff sent Jay Jacobs,
Auburn’s Athletic Director, a request for documents, including
telephone records and emails related to Newton’s recruiting, as
well as bank records for Newton’s parents.78  In addition, the NCAA
warned Newton and the Auburn football coaches that if they dis-
cussed the matter among themselves, they would be in violation of
NCAA Bylaws 10.1 (Unethical Conduct) and/or 32 (Cooperative
Principle).79
Auburn denied that it had paid Newton or his father for
Newton’s transfer or that it had violated any NCAA Bylaws in
recruiting Newton.  However, in the middle of a run to a possible
national championship, Auburn had to decide whether to play
Newton and risk having to forfeit wins and possibly championships
in the event Newton and Auburn were later found to have violated
NCAA Bylaws, or declare Newton ineligible and risk the chance to
win a national championship.  The NCAA determined that Cecil
Newton had in fact made such a demand and, on November 30,
2010, declared Newton ineligible, only days before undefeated Au-
burn was scheduled to play South Carolina in the SEC
Championship.80
Auburn’s athletic department immediately filed a request seek-
ing Newton’s reinstatement on the ground that Newton was una-
76. See Cam Newton Runs for 2 TDs, Throws 3 TDs in Auburn Romp, ESPN, Sept.
4, 2010, http://espn.go.com/ncf/recap?gameId=302470002 (discussing initial suc-
cess of Cam Newton’s career at Auburn).
77. See Bill Bell, Mississippi State Booster, Says He Received Payment Plan For Cam
Newton: Report, HUFFINGTON POST, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/11/17/bill-bell-booster-cam-newton_n_785196.html (providing evidence
that Cecil Newton sought cash payments from Mississippi State Boosters).
78. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Cam Newton Investigation Documents,
[hereinafter “Cam Newton Investigation Documents”], available at http://
i.usatoday.net/sports/college/football/2011-11-04-ncaa-auburn-newton.pdf (last
visited Nov. 25, 2014) (collection of documents related to NCAA’s investigation
into Cam Newton’s situation).
79. See id. (providing evidence that NCAA determined Cecil Newton made
certain demands and that Cam Newton was ineligible to play).
80. See Cam Newton Cleared to Play, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/
news/story?id=5870788 (last updated Dec. 3, 2010) (evidencing that Cam Newton
was declared ineligible to play after confirmation that Cecil Newton had in fact
made demand).
15
Wong et al.: NCAA Division I Athletic Directors: An Analysis of the Responsibi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 16 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 16 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 16 31-MAR-15 13:44
16 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 1
ware of his father’s request and that he was not using Kenny
Rogers, the Mississippi State booster and alumnus to whom Cecil’s
request was made, as an impermissible agent.81  The very next day,
December 1, 2010, the NCAA agreed with Auburn and reinstated
Newton.82  Newton went on to lead Auburn to the SEC Champion-
ship, national championship and to win the Heisman Trophy.
Following his junior season, Newton chose to enter the NFL
Draft rather than return for his fourth year of collegiate football.
Newton’s decision to turn professional was also fraught with poten-
tial compliance problems.  Considering Newton’s level of play, he
almost certainly attracted the attention of NFL player representa-
tion firms, i.e., agents, and their ugly cousin, “runners.”83  The
player representation industry is a fiercely competitive, and many
claim often unethical, business.84  Agents, runners, financial advi-
sors, marketing advisors, and almost anyone who believed they
could earn income or notoriety from representing Newton likely
tried to recruit Newton and persuade him to utilize their services.
The NCAA has a strict prohibition against the use of agents by
student-athletes or even agreeing to future use of a particular
81. See Cam Newton Investigation Documents, supra note 78 (illustrating that R
Auburn filed request for reinstatement, arguing that Cam Newton was unaware of
his father’s demand).
82. See Erick Smith, NCAA Rules Auburn’s Newton Eligible for now After Rules Vio-
lation, USA TODAY, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/
post/2010/12/auburn-cam-newton-ncaa-eligible/1 (last updated Dec. 1, 2010)
(discussing Cam Newton’s reinstatement).  In October 2011, the NCAA closed its
investigation into Auburn’s recruitment of Newton without any punishment.  The
NCAA interviewed more than 50 people and was unable to determine that Newton
or his family received improper benefits from Auburn. See Charles Goldberg,
NCAA Says Auburn Had No Major Violations, Ends Investigation in Signing of
Quarterback Cam Newton, AL.COM, http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2011/10/
ncaa_says_auburn_finds_no_majo.html (last updated Oct. 12, 2011) (illustrating
that NCAA ended investigation into Auburn’s signing of Cam Newton). See also
Letter from Jackie A. Thomas, NCAA Director of Enforcement, to Jay Jacobs, Ath-
letic Director of Auburn University, Oct. 11, 2011, available at http://media.al
.com/sports_impact/other/JJacobs_OC_101111_Auburn%28JAT%29.pdf (illus-
trating that NCAA did not find Auburn in violation with regards to Cam Newton).
83. See Chris Deubert, What’s a “Clean” Agent to Do? The Case for a Cause of
Action Against a Players Association, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (2011) (discuss-
ing term “runner”). “The term ‘runner’ generally describes someone employed by
an agent, typically a young person, whose job is to become friendly with the stu-
dent-athlete, providing the student-athlete with cash, meals, clothes or other gifts
and ultimately steering the student-athlete towards the employing agent.” See id.
84. See id. (discussing competitiveness of player representation industry).  See
also Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 1999)
(granting defendant sports agency summary judgment in its defense against com-
peting sports agency’s tortious interference with business relationship suit arising
out of then Texas Ranger Ivan Rodriguez switching agencies).
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agent.85  Moreover, accepting anything of value from agent can im-
mediately and, perhaps, irretrievably cause a student-athlete to lose
his or her amateurism status and eligibility.  Thus, it would have
been essential for Auburn’s athletic department to maintain close
scrutiny of persons approaching Newton about his potential profes-
sional career and to warn Newton of the relevant Bylaws and
concerns.86
There are also several actions that an athletic and compliance
department can and should take to assist a student-athlete consider-
ing turning professional.  Before the season even begins, the school
should consider whether the student-athlete should participate in
the NCAA Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance
(“ESDI”) Program to protect against the risk of injury.87  The
school is permitted (and should) inquire of a professional sports
organization about the student-athlete’s professional prospects.88
Basketball and hockey student-athletes are permitted to attend try-
outs or draft combines provided they only receive “actual and nec-
essary travel, and room and board expenses.”89  The university can
also facilitate and control the process for interviewing agents and
other advisors.90  Additionally, NCAA Bylaws specifically contem-
plate and allow the use of a “Professional Sports Counseling Panel”
to assist student-athletes in the process of turning professional.91
85. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.3.1 (evidencing NCAA’s strict R
prohibition again student-athletes’ use of agents). See also Oliver v. NCAA, 920
N.E.2d 203 (Ohio C.P., Erie Cnty 2009) (illustrating example in which NCAA sus-
pended student-athlete for using agent while negotiating with MLB Club in consid-
ering whether to turn professional).
86. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 14.02.1 (evidencing the NCAA Aca- R
demic Progress Rate requirement).  Newton’s early departure from Auburn also
negatively affected Auburn’s Academic Progress Rate which has the potential to
bring sanctions from the NCAA, such as loss of scholarships or postseason
ineligibility.
87. See Chris Deubert, et al., Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to Student-
Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 553, 568-74 (2011) (discussing ‘ESDI’ program to protect student-athletes
against injury).
88. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.2.4 (discussing recommendation R
that school should inquire into student-athlete’s professional prospects after
college).
89. See id. art. 12.2.1.3.1 (concerning basketball student-athletes); id. art.
12.2.1.3.2 (concerning hockey student-athletes).
90. See generally Deubert, supra note 87 (discussing how university can facili- R
tate and control agent and advisor interview process for student-athletes).
91. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 12.3.4 (evidencing that universities R
can use “Professional Sports Counseling Panel[s]” in accordance with NCAA
bylaws).
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As Newton’s story demonstrates, the greater the athlete, the
greater the compliance risk and issues.  Auburn and Newton ulti-
mately weathered a tumultuous run through the NCAA rope ladder
and came out clean on the other side.  Auburn got its first national
championship since 1957 and the Carolina Panthers chose Newton
as the first overall pick in the 2011 NFL Draft.  None of which
would have been possible without Auburn Athletic Director Jay Ja-
cobs and his staff’s compliance with NCAA Bylaws.
1. Student-Athlete Compensation and Rights of Publicity
The structure and method by which the NCAA and athletic de-
partments produce their revenue has been under constant legal at-
tack.  Notably, by virtue of the amateurism concept to which college
athletics adheres, college athletics operate without directly compen-
sating the most important part of the production: the student-ath-
letes.  Moreover, NCAA rules prohibit student-athletes from
receiving income based on their athletic success.  This imbalanced
relationship has regularly sparked outrage from commentators and
litigation from student-athletes.
The most important litigation ever concerning these issues is
currently being waged and poses a threat to the fundamental struc-
ture of the NCAA and college athletics.  In O’Bannon v. NCAA, Hon-
orable Claudia Wilken of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that the NCAA’s prohibitions
on student-athletes receiving a share of the revenues that the NCAA
and its member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the
student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live
game telecasts, and other footage violates antitrust law.92  The
Court did not agree that the restrictions were necessary to preserve
amateurism, maintain competitive balance, or to integrate academ-
ics and athletics.93  The Court enjoined certain NCAA bylaws but
92. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that NCAA’s prohibition against student-athletes receiv-
ing shares of revenue violates antitrust law).  In related litigation, courts had previ-
ously determined that student-athletes have a right of publicity. See, e.g., In re
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir.
2013) (video game developer’s use of likenesses of college athletes in its video
games was not protected by First Amendment, and therefore former college foot-
ball player’s right-of-publicity claims against developer were not barred by Califor-
nia’s anti-SLAPP statute); Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013)
(video game developer’s use of likenesses of college athletes in its video games was
not protected by First Amendment).
93. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (holding that NCAA restrictions
were not necessary to preserve amateur athletics).
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nevertheless permitted the NCAA to regulate how the revenues are
paid to the student-athletes, including the timing and amount:
The Court will enjoin the NCAA from enforcing any rules
or bylaws that would prohibit its member schools and con-
ferences from offering their FBS football or Division I bas-
ketball recruits a limited share of the revenues generated
from the use of their names, images, and likenesses in ad-
dition to a full grant-in-aid. The injunction will not pre-
clude the NCAA from implementing rules capping the
amount of compensation that may be paid to student-ath-
letes while they are enrolled in school; however, the NCAA
will not be permitted to set this cap below the cost of at-
tendance, as the term is defined in its current bylaws.
The injunction will also prohibit the NCAA from enforc-
ing any rules to prevent its member schools and confer-
ences from offering to deposit a limited share of licensing
revenue in trust for their FBS football and Division I bas-
ketball recruits, payable when they leave school or their
eligibility expires. Although the injunction will permit the
NCAA to set a cap on the amount of money that may be
held in trust, it will prohibit the NCAA from setting a cap
of less than five thousand dollars (in 2014 dollars) for
every year that the student-athlete remains academically
eligible to compete.94
The O’Bannon decision, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, was a limited but powerful decision viewed as the
beginning of larger changes to come.95  Most analysts believe the
lawsuit filed by Martin Jenkins, a former Clemson football player, is
the greatest threat to the NCAA’s business model.96  Originally filed
94. Id. at 1008 (quoting court’s allowance of NCAA to regulate how revenues
will be paid to student-athletes).
95. See Richard G. Johnson, When a Loss is Really a Win and the Future of the
NCAA, SPORTS BUS. DAILY, Sept. 1, 2014, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
Journal/Issues/2014/09/01/Opinion/Richard-Johnson.aspx (discussing impor-
tance of O’Bannon decision).
96. See Complaint, Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:14-cv-02758
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014), ECF No. 1 (evidencing that Martin Jenkins filed lawsuit
against Clemson). See also, e.g., Steve Eder, A Legal Titan of Labor Disputes Sets His
Sights on the NCAA: Jeffrey Kessler Envisions Open Market for College Athletics, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2014, [hereinafter “Eder 1”], http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/
sports/jeffrey-kessler-envisions-open-market-for-ncaa-college-athletes.html (discuss-
ing recent case that Jeffrey Kessler filed on behalf of Martin Jones); Steve Eder,
How Kessler’s Lawsuit Could Change College Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, [herein-
after “Eder 2”], http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/sports/how-jeffrey-kesslers-
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in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the
case was later transferred to Judge Wilken in California.97  The Jen-
kins lawsuit aims for the heart of the NCAA – alleging that the
NCAA’s rules prohibiting student-athletes from being paid is an an-
titrust violation.98  The lawsuit’s stature is due not only to its allega-
tions but also to its counsel.  Jenkins’ lead attorney is Jeffrey Kessler
of Winston Strawn LLP.99  Kessler is one of the most prominent
sports lawyers ever, having represented every professional sports
league player association and having been involved in most of the
seminal sports litigations.100
In September 2014, the NCAA moved to dismiss the Jenkins
case, arguing that NCAA eligibility rules serve legitimate pro-com-
petitive purposes of maximizing consumer demand for amateur stu-
dent-athlete intercollegiate sports and integrating student-athletes
into the academic communities of their schools.101  A decision will
not come for some time, but a decision in either direction will not
end the legal attacks on the NCAA.  Several other cases are pending
and will likely continue to be filed as rulings chip away at the
NCAA’s structure.
Athletic Directors must be aware of the litigations and related
issues.  Not only must Athletic Directors ensure compliance with
evolving bylaws and court decisions, but Athletic Directors must
also begin to plan for the future.  Changes are coming which poten-
tially will have considerable impact on the size and structure of col-
lege athletic departments.  Those schools that have considered and
planned for the changes will make the best adaptations and be posi-
tioned for success sooner.
Additionally, Athletic Directors should consider how the evolv-
ing policies and public opinion might affect recruiting.  From a fi-
nancial standpoint, schools might soon be able to offer
compensation in some form to student-athletes.  Athletic Directors
lawsuit-could-change-college-sports.html (arguing that Martin Jenkins case is great-
est threat to NCAA business model).
97. See Jenkins, supra note 99, 14-cv-2758 (N.D.Ca.), ECF No. 89.
98. See Eder 1, supra note 96 (evidencing that Jenkins lawsuit filed against R
NCAA argues that not paying colleges athletes is antitrust violation). See also Eder
2, supra note 96 (evidencing how Jenkins case aims at heart of NCAA). R
99. See Eder 1, supra note 96 (evidencing that Jenkins lead counsel is Jeffrey R
Kessler). See also Eder 2, supra note 96 (illustrating that lead counsel for Martin R
Jenkins is Jeffrey Kessler).
100. See Eder 1, supra note 96 (discussing prominence of NCAA). See also Eder R
2, supra note 96 (providing information regarding importance of Jeffrey Kessler in R
sports law).
101. See Jenkins, supra note 99, 14-cv-2758 (N.D.Ca.), ECF No. 102.
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must determine the extent to which their athletic departments can
be financially competitive.  Additionally, Athletic Directors might
try to offer student-athletes a package of promises that addresses
their concerns to the extent possible within existing NCAA rules.
For example, prior to the 2014-15 academic year, Indiana Univer-
sity announced its commitment to a “Student-Athlete Bill of
Rights.”102  The Bill of Rights includes ten principles: (1) providing
scholarships which cover the full cost of attendance; (2) four year
scholarships regardless of injury, illness or athletic performance;
(3) an open invitation for student-athletes who leave school early to
return and finish their degree; (4) comprehensive academic sup-
port; (5) comprehensive health, safety, and wellness; (6) compre-
hensive athletic support; (7) comprehensive leadership and skills
development; (8) a culture of trust and respect; (9) a collective
voice through the Student Athlete Advisory Committee; and, (10)
cutting edge technology.103  If Indiana sees a noticeable improve-
ment in its recruiting efforts, you can expect other schools to adopt
similar forward-thinking policies.
B. Conference Issues and Responsibilities
It has long been recognized that sporting organizations must
combine for certain purposes to enable them to conduct sporting
contests.104  Leagues or conferences permit sporting organizations,
such as teams and colleges, to create uniform rules and regulations,
schedule games reliably and engage in transactions for the collec-
tive benefit of all members, such as selling television rights.  College
sports are no different.
102. See IU Announces Unprecedented Student-Athlete Bill of Rights, INDIANA
HOOSIERS ATHLETIC NEWS, June 27, 2014, http://www.iuhoosiers.com/genrel/
062714aab.html (discussing recent 10-point document which “sets forth univer-
sity’s commitment to student-athletes during their time at IU and beyond”)
103. See INDIANA UNIVERSITY, INDIANA UNIVERSITY STUDENT-ATHLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS (2013), available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/ind/genrel/
auto_pdf/2013-14/misc_non_event/BillOfRights.pdf (providing text of ten
principles).
104. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 331
(2d Cir. 2008) (arguing that “competition among the teams in their fields of play is
to an extent dependent upon the teams’ cooperation with each other in various
other respects”); Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2004);
N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1982)
(arguing that to perform [certain] functions some sort of economic joint venture
is essential); Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 389 F.Supp. 867, 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (arguing that some degree of economic cooperation which is inherently
anti-competitive may well be essential for survival of ostensibly competitive profes-
sional sports league (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F.Supp. 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)));
Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club, 351 F.Supp. 462 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
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With a few exceptions, each NCAA Division I institution is a
member of a conference for the sports in which it participates.105
For example, the 127 FBS football teams have divided themselves
into 10 conferences;106 the 351 men’s basketball teams have divided
themselves into 32 conferences.107  Considering the interlocking
purpose and power of the conferences, legal issues necessarily fol-
low about which Athletic Directors must be aware.  Just as the
NCAA has Bylaws governing its 1,300 member institutions, each col-
legiate conference has Bylaws governing its members.  The Bylaws
compliment the NCAA Bylaws and while also governing the rela-
tionship between the conference’s member institutions.
The Bylaws of the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”), widely
considered to be the conference with the best college football
teams,108 provide an interesting example.109  Due to the competi-
tiveness with which the schools must compete, the Bylaws contain
aspirational statements concerning recruiting and academic integ-
rity.110  For example, SEC Bylaw 10.2.3 provides that, coaches and
their personnel “shall avoid making any derogatory statements con-
cerning another member institution’s athletic program, facilities or
educational opportunities.”111
The SEC Bylaws also contain certain strict rules concerning
recruiting.  SEC Bylaw 13.9.1 limits each SEC member institution to
105. See College Football Teams, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-football/
teams (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (evidencing that Division I college football teams
are split into conferences).  Some exceptions to the rule are: Army, BYU, Idaho,
Navy, New Mexico State, Notre Dame and Old Dominion compete as independ-
ents in football. See id. (evidencing that some college football teams compete as
Independents).  Further, New Jersey Institute of Technology competes as an inde-
pendent in basketball. See Men’s College Basketball, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/
mens-college-basketball/teams (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (evidencing that New
Jersey Institute of Technology competes as independent in basketball).
106. See College Football Teams, supra note 105 (illustrating that college football R
teams are divided into 10 conferences).
107. See Mens College Basketball, supra note 105 (indicating that men’s college R
basketball teams are divided into 32 conferences).
108. See Ira Boudway, Why the SEC Dominates College Football, in Six Charts,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 27, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2013-12-27/why-the-sec-dominates-college-football-in-six-charts (evidencing that
SEC considered to be best college football conference).  See also Sharon Katz, SEC
Still the Best in College Football, ESPN (Jan. 14, 2014), http://espn.go.com/blog/
statsinfo/post/_/id/82730/sec-still-the-best-in-college-football (reporting that col-
lege football’s best conference is widely considered to be SEC).
109. See SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE, SEC CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS (2013-
2014), available at http://cdn.knoxblogs.com/evanseleven/wp-content/uploads/
sites/7/2013/12/Constitution.pdf (providing text of current SEC bylaws).
110. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, arts. 10.2, 10.3 (containing aspira- R
tional statements regarding recruiting and academic integrity).
111. See id. art. 10.2.3 (providing example under SEC bylaws) .
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signing 25 football prospective student-athletes to a National Letter
of Intent (“NLI”).112  The limits on NLIs arose out of a controver-
sial practice referred to as “oversigning.”  Oversigning occurs when
a university signs more prospective student-athletes to NLIs than
they have scholarships to offer.
Division I football programs are limited to 25 scholarships for
freshmen.113  However, NCAA Bylaws permit schools to sign 28
NLIs.114  As a result, three prospective student-athletes who sign
NLIs with a school, intending to play football there, may ultimately
not be offered a scholarship.  Schools might intentionally oversign
players to prevent them from signing with a competing university.
By the time the student-athlete is told he will not be offered a schol-
arship, it is often too late for him to go back and try to catch on
with one of the other schools that had recruited him.
The SEC’s Bylaw limiting oversigning is sometimes called the
“Houston Nutt Rule.”115  In 2009, University of Mississippi football
coach Houston Nutt signed 37 players to NLIs, far in excess of the
amount of scholarships Mississippi could offer.116  The SEC’s Bylaw
helps to prevent prospective student-athletes from becoming inno-
cent victims of the ferociously competitive SEC recruiting
environment.
What if a school does not like its conference Bylaws or some
other way in which the conference is operating?  The school, sub-
ject to its contractual obligations, is then free to switch conferences.
This concept is known as conference realignment and in recent
years has become a phenomenon that has regularly and fundamen-
tally altered the college sports landscape.  Conference realignment
touches on some of the most important legal and financial issues
facing college Athletic Directors, including the purpose and effect
of conference bylaws, membership decisions both from a confer-
ence and institution standpoint, and how to maximize revenues for
the athletic department and university.
112. See id. art. 13.9.1. (directing that SEC member institutions are limited to
signing 25 National Letters of Intent (NLIs)).
113. See id. art. 15.5.6.1. (illustrating that Division I members are limited to
signing 25 freshmen to scholarships).
114. See id. art. 13.9.2.3. (indicating that schools may sign up to 28 NLI’s).
115. Jon Solomon, SEC Teams Adjust to ‘Houston Nutt Rule,’ AL.COM, http://
blog.al.com/solomon/2010/02/sec_teams_adjust_to_houston_nu.html (updated
Feb. 3, 2010, 11:56 AM) (illustrating that sometimes bylaw limiting oversigning is
called “Houston Nutt Rule”).
116. See id. (discussing namesake for Houston Nutt Rule).  In 2009, the Uni-
versity of Mississippi Football Coach signed thirty-seven students to NLIs, despite
the fact that they could only offer twenty-five scholarships per NCAA bylaws. See id.
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The allure of big time college athletics, and the money and
prestige that comes with it, is generally too difficult for most univer-
sities to ignore.  In August 2007, the Big Ten conference launched
its own television network, Big Ten Network.117  The decision by
the Big Ten to create its own network was most likely spurred by a
growth in professional sports teams’ creating and owning their own
regional sports networks from which they could draw considerable
revenue, including the New York Yankees’ YES Network,118 the New
York Mets’ SNY Network119 and the Boston Red Sox’ NESN
Network.120
Looking to grow its network and customer base, the Big Ten
announced in December 2009 that it was looking to expand the
conference.121  At the time of the Big Ten’s announcement, there
was generally considered to be six elite conferences in college ath-
letics: Big Ten, Pac-10, Big East, Big 12, ACC and SEC.122 In foot-
ball, the winner of each of these conferences received an automatic
117. Press Release, Big Ten Conference, Big Ten Network to Officially
Launch August 30, (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.bigten.org/genrel/
070207aaa.html (discussing launch of Big Ten Network).
118. See Andy Fixmer & Andy Soshnick, YES Network Said to Extend Yankees
Rights Through 2042, BLOOMBERG BUS., Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-11-20/yes-network-said-to-extend-yankees-rights-through-2042
.html (describing current arrangement between YES Network and New York
Yankees).  The YES Network is a regional sports network launched in 2002 cen-
tered on New York Yankees baseball games.  YES also broadcasts a variety of college
and professional sports.  Although the Yankees no longer own the YES Network,
YES pays the Yankees approximately $350 million a year for the rights to broadcast
Yankees’ games. See id.
119. See Mike Ozanian, Mets Owners May Pay Themselves Big Dividend While
Team’s Fans Suffer, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/mike-
ozanian/2012/10/06/mets-owners-may-pay-themselves-big-dividend-while-teams-
fans-suffer/ (discussing current arrangement between SNY Network and New York
Mets).  The SNY Network is a regional sports network launched in 2006 centered
around New York Mets baseball games.  SNY, like YES, also broadcasts a variety of
college and professional sports.  SNY is principally owned by the Mets and is valued
at $2.5 billion. See id.
120. See Fenway Sports Group, Background on Fenway Sports Group, NESN NET-
WORK, http://nesn.com/about-fenway-sports-group (last visited Nov. 25, 2014)
(describing NESN Network as most watched sports network in New England).
NESN is a regional sports network that is the primary broadcaster of Boston Red
Sox and Boston Bruins games.  NESN also broadcasts other regional sporting
events.  Fenway Sports Group, the parent company of the Red Sox, owns 80% of
NESN.  The Bruins own the other 20%. See id.
121. Press Release, Big Ten Conference, Big Ten Statement on Expansion
(Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.bigten.org/genrel/121509aaa.html (pro-
viding text of Big Ten Network’s intent to expand conference).
122. Michael Wilbon, Small But Powerful, College Teams Can Make A Big Impres-
sion This Weekend, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/02/AR2009090203969.html (reporting that at time
of Big Ten Network’s expansion, there were generally six conferences).
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bid to the Bowl Championship Series, which from 1998-2013 were
the preeminent and most lucrative college football bowl games.  As
of 2009, these six conferences (and their predecessors)123 consisted
of 67 schools124 that generally dominated college athletics and col-
lege basketball and football in particular.125
However, the Big Ten set off a series of events that caused doz-
ens of Division I universities to shift their conference affiliations in
search of bigger paydays.  For example, in 2008, the SEC, widely
regarded as the best conference in college football, signed a 15-year
deal with ESPN worth more than $2 billion;126 in 2011, the former
Pac-10 and current Pac-12 announced plans to launch its own tele-
vision network;127 and, in 2012, the ACC signed a 12-year, $1.86
billion contract with ESPN.128  In each instance, the presidents of
the universities with the support and guidance of their Athletic Di-
rectors voted and approved these television deals.
The end result was mass movement among the schools and the
disintegration of the Big East.  Although the Big East had histori-
cally been a strong basketball conference, it included seven catholic
school members that did not play FBS football.129  Having non-FBS
playing members left the Big East at a considerable disadvantage in
123. See Chris Dufresne, Merger Creates Dynamite Dozen, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-08-27/sports/sp-38013_1_big-west (evi-
dencing importance of being part of one of six big conferences).  Oklahoma State,
Kansas State, Nebraska, Iowa State, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado and Missouri
were originally in the Big Eight Conference.  However, in 1996, they joined Texas
A&M, Texas Tech, Texas, and Baylor to form the Big 12. See id.
124. See Mike Bostock, Shan Carter & Kevin Quealy, Tracing the History of
N.C.A.A. Conferences, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/new-
sgraphics/2013/11/30/football-conferences/?ref=sports (providing history of
NCAA Conferences).  The conferences had the following amount of members: Big
Ten: 11; Pac-10: 10; Big East: 10; Big 12: 12; ACC: 12; and, SEC: 12. See id.  In 2009,
the big six conferences consisted of a total of 67 schools. See id.
125. The last football national champion not to come from one of these six
conferences was BYU in 1984, a member of the Western Athletic Conference.  The
last men’s basketball champion not to come from one of these six conferences was
UNLV in 1991, a member of the Big West Conference.
126. See ESPN Signs 15-year Deal With SEC, ESPN (Aug. 25, 2008), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=3553033 (evidencing that SEC and ESPN
signed deal).
127. See Pac-12 to Launch National Network, ESPN (July 27, 2011), http://
espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6809599/pac-12-launch-national-regional-
networks (evidencing that Pac-12 had announced plans to start its own network).
128. See Chris Smith, Did ACC Teams Get Ripped Off With New ESPN TV Con-
tract?, FORBES (May 9, 2012, 7:16PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/
2012/05/09/did-acc-teams-get-ripped-off-with-new-espn-tv-contract/ (illustrating
TV contract between ACC and ESPN).
129. The “Catholic Seven” is made up of the following schools: Georgetown,
Providence, St. John’s, Seton Hall, Villanova, DePaul, and Marquette.
25
Wong et al.: NCAA Division I Athletic Directors: An Analysis of the Responsibi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 21 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 21 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 26 31-MAR-15 13:44
26 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 1
attracting the type of television revenue that was now being gener-
ated.  None of the other major conferences had non-FBS members.
As a result, the Athletic Directors of the Big East institutions that
played FBS football sought and took the opportunity to jump to
other conferences with FBS play and a share of the lucrative televi-
sion revenue those conferences were receiving.
Beginning in 2013-14, the Big East no longer existed in the
form it had since its creation in 1979.  The Big East schools that did
play football formed the America Athletic Conference and re-
cruited new institutional members from all over the country.130
Meanwhile, the “Catholic Seven” began to operate under the Big
East moniker, adding three other private universities to the confer-
ence: Butler, Creighton, and Xavier.131
The below chart shows the multitude of conference moves be-
tween 2011 and 2014:
Conference Schools Lost Schools Gained 
Big Ten None. 
Nebraska (2011); 
Maryland (2014); 
and, Rutgers (2014). 
Pac-10 None. Colorado (2011); and, Utah (2011). 
Big East 
West Virginia (2012); 
Connecticut (2013); 
Louisville (2013); Syracuse 
(2013); Pittsburgh (2013); 
Notre Dame (2013); Rutgers 
(2013); South Florida 
(2013); Cincinnati (2013); 
and, Temple (2013). 
Temple (2012) 
(football only); 
Butler (2013); 
Creighton (2013); 
and, Xavier (2013). 
Big 12 
Colorado (2011); Nebraska 
(2011); Missouri (2012); 
and, Texas A&M (2012). 
TCU (2012); and, 
West Virginia 
(2012). 
ACC Maryland (2014). 
Notre Dame (2013); 
Pittsburgh (2013); 
Syracuse (2013); 
and, Louisville 
(2014). 
SEC None. 
Missouri (2012); 
and, Texas A&M 
(2012). 
130. In 2014-15, the American Athletic Conference includes Cincinnati, Con-
necticut, Houston, Memphis, Southern Methodist, South Florida, Temple, Central
Florida, East Carolina, Tulane, and Tulsa, covering in total nine states from Con-
necticut to Oklahoma.
131. Dan Wolken, New Big East Adds Three, Signs Deal with Fox, USA TODAY,
Mar. 20, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/03/20/new-
big-east-adds-xavier-butler-creighton-signs-tv-contract/2002227/ (explaining that
Big East added three schools to its conference).
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Chasing the money is not as simple as it seems.  Conferences
were, and became increasingly, wary of losing their most successful
members to other conferences.  In October 2011, West Virginia an-
nounced it was leaving the Big East beginning with the 2012-13 aca-
demic year.132  However, the Big East required its members to
provide 27 months’ notice before leaving the conference.133  West
Virginia sued the Big East in West Virginia Circuit Court for breach
of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and sought a permanent
injunction against the Big East Bylaw requiring 27 months’ no-
tice.134  On November 4, 2011, the Big East sued West Virginia in
Rhode Island Superior Court (the Big East’s headquarters is in
Providence) alleging breach of contract and seeking to force West
Virginia to comply with the 27-month waiting period.135
In February 2012, the Big East and West Virginia settled the
lawsuits.  Pursuant to the settlement, the Big East received approxi-
mately $20 million, including: (1) a $2.5 million withdrawal fee pre-
viously paid in October 2011; (2) a $8.5 million settlement
payment; and (3) approximately $9 million in revenues West Vir-
ginia was due to receive from the Big East.136  As a result, West Vir-
ginia was permitted to leave the Big East after the 2011-12 school
year.
On the heels of the West Virginia litigation, the ACC sought to
protect itself from similar defections.  At a September 2012 meeting
of the ACC Council of Presidents, the Council voted to amend the
ACC Constitution to provide “that upon notice of withdrawal from
the association of members, a withdrawing member shall be subject
132. Pete Thamel, West Virginia Wants Out, but Big East Won’t Let Go, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/sports/ncaafootball/
west-virginia-accepts-invitation-joining-big-12.html?_r=0 (evidencing West Vir-
ginia’s intent to leave Big East Conference to join Big 12).
133. West Virginia Sues Big East Conference In Effort To Join Big 12 Immediately,
HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/31/
west-virginia-sues-big-east-conference-big-12_n_1068324.html (last updated Dec.
31, 2011) (illustrating Big East’s rule that member institutions give them 27
months’ notice of intention to leave conference).
134. See id. (describing lawsuit between West Virginia and Big East). See also
Rutgers v. Am. Athletic Conf., No. 12-7898 (N.J. Super. Nov. 20, 2012).
135. Andrea Adelson, Big East Sues West Virginia Over Bylaws, ESPN  (Nov. 5,
2011), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7190474/big-east-sues-west-
virginia-enforce-27-month-waiting-period (reporting that Big East countersued
West Virginia in Rhode Island Superior Court).  The Big East’s headquarters is in
Providence, Rhode Island. See id.
136. See Steve Berkowitz, Document Details West Virginia’s $20 Million Exit Fee to
Big East, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 2012, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
campusrivalry/post/2012/02/west-virginia-big-east-settlement-document-details/
1#.Uu0KjfbbH2k (discussing lawsuit between Big East and West Virginia).
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to a withdrawal payment in an amount ‘equal to three (3) times the
total operating budget of the Conference (including any contin-
gency included therein), approved in accordance with Section V-I
of the Conference Bylaws, which is in effect as of the date of the
official notice of withdrawal.’”137
Maryland President Dr. Wallace D. Loh voted against the new
withdrawal fee.138  Maryland’s decision not to vote in favor of the
fee was almost certainly tied to its then ongoing discussions about
leaving the ACC for the Big Ten.  Indeed, On November 19, 2012,
Maryland’s Board of Regents voted to withdraw from the ACC to
join the Big Ten starting in 2014.139
On November 26, 2012, the ACC initiated a lawsuit against Ma-
ryland in North Carolina Superior Court (the ACC’s headquarters
are in Greensboro), asserting one cause of action for declaratory
relief.140  The ACC sought a declaration that Maryland is subject to
a withdrawal fee of $52,266,342.141  The annual operating budget of
the ACC for the 2012-2013 year was $17,422,114.142  Thus, three
times the operating budget equaled the $52,266,342 withdrawal fee
that the ACC alleged Maryland owed.
On January 18, 2013, Maryland responded by suing the ACC in
Maryland Circuit Court seeking a declaration that the exit fee was
an unenforceable penalty, for its approximately $3 million share of
conference revenue withheld by the ACC, and for damages for al-
leged violations of Maryland antitrust law and tortious interfer-
137. See Complaint at 14, Atl. Coast Conf. v. Univ. of Md., Coll. Park, 751
S.E.2d 612 (N.C. Super.Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2013) (No. 12CVS10736) (alleging ACC’s
fear that one of its member institutions would leave the conference).  The ACC
amended its constitution to provide itself more protection against institutions that
decided to leave the conference. See id.
138. See Alex Prewitt, Maryland President Wallace D. Loh Voted Against ACC’s $50
Million Exit fee, Says it’s ‘Not a Good Idea’, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2012, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/terrapins-insider/post/maryland-president-wallace-d-
loh-voted-against-accs-50-million-exit-fee-says-its-not-a-good-idea/2012/09/13/
683ff014-fe12-11e1-8adc-499661afe377_blog.html (evidencing that University of
Maryland disagreed with new withdrawal fee that ACC had added to its
constitution).
139. See Barry Svrluga & Alex Prewitt, Big Ten Expansion: Maryland Leaves ACC,
Joins Conference in Financial Move, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2012, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/maryland-joins-big-ten-leaving-acc/2012/11/19/
e24531dc-3268-11e2-9cfa-e41bac906cc9_story.html (discussing University of Mary-
land’s decision to withdraw from ACC and join Big 10).
140. See generally Complaint, Atl. Coast Conf., 751 S.E.2d 612 (No.
12CVS10736) (evidencing that ACC filed lawsuit against University of Maryland as
result of its withdrawal from ACC).
141. See Complaint at 9, Atl. Coast Conf., 751 S.E.2d 612 (No. 12CVS10736)
(arguing that Maryland was subject to withdrawal fee of $52,266,342).
142. See id. at 24 (demonstrating annual operating budget of ACC).
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ence.143  In a June 27, 2013 opinion, the Maryland Circuit Court
dismissed Maryland’s state antitrust claim without prejudice and
stayed the case pending final judgment in the North Carolina
lawsuit.144
Then, in November 2013, the Court of Appeals of North Caro-
lina affirmed the Superior Court’s prior denial of Maryland’s mo-
tion to dismiss.145  The Court of Appeals held that Maryland was
not entitled to sovereign immunity.146  The Court of Appeals held
that sovereign immunity could not be used to permit a party to es-
cape its contractual obligations.147
In January 2014, forced to respond to the lawsuit, Maryland
counterclaimed against the ACC, alleging violations of antitrust law
and seeking damages trebled to a total of $157 million.148  The case
was settled in August 2014, with Maryland agreeing to let the ACC
keep approximately $31 million in payments it had withheld from
Maryland.149
While most schools have moved conferences in search of
greater revenue streams, the University of Texas remained in the
Big 12 to maintain its revenue stream.  In 2010, The Pac-10 invited
Texas to join the conference, but, as a condition of membership,
required Texas to share its media rights equally with the other
143. See Maryland AG Sues ACC, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan.18, 2013), available at
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/8858267/maryland-attorney-gen-
eral-files-suit-acc (illustrating that University of Maryland countersued ACC in Ma-
ryland circuit court).  Similarly, in December 2012, Rutgers, shortly after it
announced it was leaving the Big East for the Big Ten, sued the Big East in New
Jersey Superior Court alleging the $10 million exit fee is an unenforceable penalty
and that it should not have to comply with the 27-month waiting period com-
manded by Big East Bylaws. See Rutgers, Civ. Action No. 12-7898, slip op. at 1-2.
144. See Heather Dinich, Small Victory for ACC in Suit vs. Maryland, ESPN (July
1, 2013), http://espn.go.com/blog/acc/post/_/id/57136/small-victory-for-acc-in-
suit-vs-maryland (discussing Maryland Circuit Court’s dismissal of University of Ma-
ryland’s antirust claim against ACC).
145. See ACC, 751 S.E.2d 612 (providing evidence that North Carolina Court
of Appeals affirmed Maryland’s motion to dismiss).
146. See id. (finding that University of Maryland not entitled to sovereign
immunity).
147. See id. at 619 (citing Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423–24 (N.C. 1976))
(illustrating that Court of Appeals found that Maryland could not argue sovereign
immunity to escape contractual obligations).
148. See Heather Dinich, Maryland Files Countersuit vs. ACC, ESPN (Jan. 14,
2014), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/10292759/maryland-terra-
pins-file-157-million-counterclaim-vs-acc. (reporting University of Maryland’s coun-
tersuit against ACC in North Carolina).
149. See Steve Berkowitz, ACC, Maryland Settle for $31.4M, SALISBURY DAILY
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2014, at C2 (reporting Maryland and ACC settlement of case in
August 2014).
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members, including television revenues.150  At the time, Texas was
in the process of creating its own television network, Longhorn Net-
work, devoted to covering Texas athletic events.151  The network,
created in conjunction with ESPN, was to provide Texas with at
least $247.5 million over 20 years.152  Texas, not wanting to share
this revenue stream with other Pac-10 members, declined the Pac-
10’s invitation.153  Instead, Texas remained in the Big 12, which
permitted Texas to create the Longhorn Network and retain the
related revenues.154
The Pac-12 pressed forward without Texas.  In May 2011, the
new Pac-12 announced a 12-year deal with ESPN and Fox worth $3
billion.155  The Pac-12 also announced that the schools would share
the revenues equally, accounting to approximately $21 million an-
nually for each school.156
The revenue numbers are staggering.  Conference affiliations
have proven to be the path to those revenues.  As a result, it is im-
perative that athletic departments and Directors maximize the reve-
nue sources when the opportunity presents itself.  In other words, it
is imperative athletic departments and Directors flex their muscles
within their conference (on and off the field), and be prepared to
move to a new conference if necessary.
150. See Andy Staples, Texas’ Longhorn Network Sparking Another Big 12 Missile
Crisis, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 21, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
2011/writers/andy_staples/07/21/longhorn-network-big-12/ (providing evidence
that Univ. of Texas invited to join Pac-10 under condition that it share media
rights with other conference members).
151. See id. (discussing University of Texas’s intent to create its own Television
Network).
152. See id. (illustrating that TV network could be lucrative).
153. See id. (explaining that University of Texas declined invitation from Pac-
10 because it did not want to share revenue with other member institutions);
Chuck Carlton, Texas Turns Down Pac-10; Big 12 Schools Have Framework of Deal,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 14, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/col-
lege-sports/baylor-bears/20100614-Texas-turns-down-Pac-10-2145.ece (describing
rationale behind University of Texas’s refusal to join Pac-10).
154. See Staples, supra note 150 (illustrating that University of Texas decided R
to remain in Big 12, where it could create its own TV Network); Carlton, supra note
153 (describing benefit of Texas deciding to remain in Big 12). R
155. See Diane Pucin, New Pac-12 TV Deal Shows the Value of Sports, LA TIMES,
May 4, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/04/sports/la-sp-pac-12-tv-
20110505 (explaining Pac-12’s TV deal between ESPN and Fox after University of
Texas declined to join its conference).
156. See id. (explaining that all Pac-12 members would share revenues
equally).
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C. University Rules, Regulations, and Responsibilities
Athletic departments are ultimately still just that, departments
within a larger university.  As such, Athletic Directors must ensure
compliance with the university’s own rules and regulations while
also often playing a larger role within the university.  Athletic Direc-
tors must be particularly mindful of how a university’s rules and
regulations affect the discipline of student-athletes and/or athletic
department employees.  Moreover, Athletic Directors are often
called on to help raise money for the athletic department and for
the university.
Unfortunately but not surprisingly, student-athletes, just like
other students, occasionally break the law and/or university codes
of conduct.  How an athletic department and an athletic director
deals with those situations is as perilous as it is important.  On the
one hand, there is great pressure in ensuring that student-athletes,
particularly star student-athletes, remain in the lineup where they
can bring glory and revenue to the school.  Yet, it is also important
that student-athletes be held to the same standards (if not higher)
than other students, that they be held accountable for their actions,
and learn to become responsible adults in accordance with the ten-
ets of higher education.
One of the most infamous stories involving student-athlete
conduct and the university’s response concerned the 2006 Duke
men’s lacrosse team.  At the time, the Duke lacrosse team was con-
sidered one of the best in the country and was coming off a season
in which they were the runner-up in the NCAA Tournament.  On
March 13, 2006, the captains of the lacrosse team held a party at
their off campus residence.157  The players arranged for two strip-
pers to entertain them at the party.158  During the party, members
of the almost entirely white Duke lacrosse team got into an argu-
ment with the strippers, both of whom were minorities.159  The
157. See Juliet Macur, Lawyers for Lacrosse Players at Duke Say They Expect Indict-
ment in Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/
13/sports/sportsspecial1/13lacrosse.html?_r=2&gwh=3ACCB286CE305B02115991
ADF1E73669& (reporting that members of Duke Lacrosse team held party at off-
campus apartment).
158. See Duff Wilson & Jonathan D. Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case Give De-
tails but No Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/
25/us/25duke.html?pagewanted=all (illustrating that players hired strippers for
party).
159. See Race a Focal Point in Duke Scandal, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2006, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-16-duke-race_x.htm (explaining
significance of race in Duke Lacrosse scandal because players were predominantly
white while strippers were minorities).
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strippers left the party as racial slurs were allegedly exchanged.160
Eventually, one of the strippers, Crystal Gail Magnum, reported to
police that she had been raped at the party.161
From there, the case spiraled out of control.  Mike Nifong,
Durham County’s District Attorney, pursued the case aggressively.
The police arrested three Duke players and executed search war-
rants.162  The community was in an uproar and the story generated
national interest as the social and racial implications of the story hit
the media’s sweet spot.163  In particular, the student body and com-
munity were concerned about what they perceived as a system that
permitted privileged student-athletes to conduct themselves in ab-
horrent ways.  Joe Alleva, Duke’s Athletic Director, had to deter-
mine what to do about a lacrosse team whose season had just began
but had national championship aspirations.  In early April, Alleva
and the Duke administration cancelled the remainder of the season
and accepted the resignation of 16-year coach Mike Pressler.164
In the months that followed it was slowly revealed that Mag-
num had fabricated her story and that Nifong had continued the
investigation in an unethical and fraudulent manner.165  In June
2006, the men’s lacrosse team was reinstated.166  Magnum was even-
160. See Black Duke Lacrosse Player Says Race Has Played Issue in Alleged Rape Case,
FOXNEWS (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/10/31/black-
duke-lacrosse-player-says-race-has-played-issue-in-alleged-rape-case/ (evidencing
that lacrosse players used racial slurs).
161. See Juliet Macur, Duke Players’ Accuser Finds Way to Avoid News Media, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/sports/othersports/
03lacrosse.html?ref=dukelacrossesexualassaultcase (explaining that one stripper at
party complained that she had been raped).
162. See Shaila Dewan, Third Duke Lacrosse Player Is Indicted in Rape Case, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/16/sports/sportss-
pecial1/16duke.html (reporting that three Duke Lacrosse players were arrested
and search warrants were executed).
163. See Erik Brady & Mary Beth Marklein, A Perfect Storm: Explosive Convergence
Helps Lacrosse Scandal Resonate , USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2006, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/lacrosse/2006-04-26-duke-perfect-
storm_x.htm (describing how Duke lacrosse story gained media attention through-
out United States).
164. See Duff Wilson & Viv Bernstein, Duke Cancels Lacrosse Season and Initiates
Critiques, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/06/sports/
othersports/06duke.html?ref=dukelacrossesexualassaultcase&_r=1&gwh=808A54
B0E03C0AD0351694B3B96A6363& (discussing consequences of allegations as
Coach Pressler resigned and season was cancelled for remainder of season).
165. See Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/us/12duke
.html?pagewanted=all& (suggesting that accuser had fabricated story and that in-
vestigation was carried out in unethical manner).
166. See Viv Bernstein & Juliet Macur, Duke Reinstates Men’s Lacrosse, With
Warning That Party’s Over, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/
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tually revealed to be someone with a history of mental illness and
substance abuse and criminal issues.167  Nifong was relieved of his
duties and eventually disbarred for his conduct.168  Both accused
and non-accused members of the Duke lacrosse team filed lawsuits
against the city of Durham, Nifong, Duke, and others for the man-
ner in which the investigation unfolded.169  The lawsuit against
Duke was settled on confidential terms in 2013.170
The Duke lacrosse case became a scandal of epic, and perhaps
uncontrollable, proportions.  Nevertheless, the important takeaway
for an Athletic Director is make sure the school’s teams are aware
of their role on the campus, what behavior is acceptable and to try
and prevent scandals before they can happen.
In 2013, Florida State University handled a similarly scandalous
matter in a different way.  On November 14, 2013, the Florida State
2006/06/06/sports/sportsspecial1/06duke.html (discussing reinstatement of
men’s lacrosse at Duke).
167. See Susannah Meadows, Duke Lacrosse Accuser Crystal Mangum’s Tragic Life,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/duke-lacrosse-accuser-crys-
tal-mangums-tragic-life-75197 (discussing accuser’s history of mental illness, sub-
stance abuse, and criminal convictions).  In Nov. 2013, Magnum was convicted of
second-degree murder for stabbing her boyfriend to death. See also North Carolina:
Woman in Duke Case Guilty in Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/11/23/us/north-carolina-woman-in-duke-case-guilty-in-killing.html
(discussing life of Duke lacrosse accuser).
168. See North Carolina Attorney General Agrees to Mike Nifong’s Request to Be Re-
moved From Duke Lacrosse Case, FOXNEWS, Jan. 13, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/2007/01/13/north-carolina-attorney-general-agrees-to-mike-nifong-request-
to-be-removed/ (discussing prosecutor’s removal from Duke Lacrosse case); Duff
Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Disbarred by Ethics Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/us/17duke.html?ref=dukelacrossesexualas
saultcase&_r=1&gwh=6CDFA69AACC12A02A2AEF9436D5ACB92& (reporting
prosecutor was disbarred for actions on Duke case).
169. See Bob Van Voris, Duke Lacrosse Players to Sue School Over Rape Probe,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarch
ive&sid=aGFGx2r1QLQ4 (discussing accused and unaccused students’ filing of
lawsuit against City, prosecutor, and Duke for handling of investigation).  In
March 2013, the players confidentially settled their lawsuit with Duke. See Andrew
Harris, Ex-Duke Lacrosse Players End Lawsuit Against School, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-28/duke-university-lacrosse-
players-end-lawsuit-against-school.html.  In December 2012, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the players’ fed-
eral law claims against Durham and its police department. See Evans v. Chalmers,
703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012).  On March 31, 2011, the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina ruled that most of the players’ claims
against Nifong could proceed. See Evans v. City of Durham, No. 1:07CV739, 2011
WL 10619638 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011).  The status of the case as against Nifong
since that time is unclear from the publicly available docket. See id.
170. See Duke, Former Lacrosse Players Settle Suit, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/lacrosse/2013/02/28/duke-
2006-rape-allegations/1953607/ (reporting settlement of lawsuit between former
players and Duke under confidential terms).
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Attorney’s Office announced they were investigating a sexual as-
sault allegation against Jameis Winston, Florida State’s star fresh-
man quarterback.171  At the time, Florida State was undefeated and
Winston was having a tremendous season.172  Fortunately, Florida
State had established policies for dealing with such a situation.
Florida State’s Intercollegiate Athletics Policies and Procedures
Manual dictated that a student-athlete would not be automatically
suspended until he or she was charged with a felony.173  Winston
thus continued to play and win.
On December 5, 2013, it was announced that Winston would
not be charged with any crime as a result of the investigation.174
Winston went on to win the Heisman Trophy and Florida State
capped an undefeated season with a national championship.175
The difference in approaches by Duke and Florida State high-
lights an important distinction about which any collegiate authority
figure should be aware.  Duke is a private institution while Florida
State is public.
Public institutions are required to provide due process in ac-
cordance with the United States Constitution.176  Due process gen-
erally entails notice of the allegations against you, the right to a
hearing in front of a neutral decision maker, the opportunity to
present favorable evidence and witnesses, the right to confront and
171. David M. Hale & Mark Schlabach, Jameis Winston Part of Investigation,
ESPN  (Nov. 14, 2013), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/
9973046/jameis-winston-florida-state-seminoles-investigated-2012-sexual-assault-
case (discussing investigation into Jameis Winston about alleged sexual assault).
172. See Paul Myerberg, Heisman Rankings: FSU’s Jameis Winston in Front, USA
TODAY, Nov. 12, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/11/
12/heisman-rankings-jameis-winston-johnny-manziel-aj-mccarron/3502097/ (dis-
cussing Jameis Winston and Florida State’s historical season prior to allegations
against Winston).  Florida State had a record of 9-0, and Winston had thrown for
2,661 yards, 27 touchdowns and seven interceptions, and tallied 157 rushing yards
to go with three rushing touchdowns. See id.
173. See FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES 201 (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/
fsu/genrel/auto_pdf/policyprocedure_5410.pdf (discussing current policy that
student-athlete not suspended until charged with felony).
174. See Mark Schlabach, FSU’s Jameis Winston Not Charged, ESPN (Dec. 6,
2013), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10082441/jameis-win-
ston-not-charged-sexual-assault-investigation (reporting that Jameis Winston would
not be charged with sexual assault).
175. See Gerry Ahern, Florida State Tops Auburn for BCS Championship on Late
TD, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/
2014/01/07/florida-state-auburn-bcs-national-championship-game/4345221/ (dis-
cussing Florida State’s victory in BCS Championship game).
176. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (illustrating that public
institutions are required to provide Due Process in accordance with Constitution);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (same).
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cross-examine the accuser or adverse witnesses, the right to an at-
torney and the right to an appeal.177  In contrast, private institu-
tions are not required to provide due process to its students.  The
relationship between a student and a private university is a matter
of contract and private universities are generally only required to
provide the protections afforded by the university’s policies and
regulations governing student conduct,178 which generally do not
include the type of due process protections afforded by the
Constitution.179
Of course, schools must also be aware of university rules and
regulations when it comes to the behavior of coaches.  In recent
years, numerous coaches have been terminated for conduct that vi-
olated the university’s regulations and perhaps the law.  In Decem-
ber 2009, Mike Leach, the winningest football coach in Texas Tech
history and an attorney, was fired for allegedly ordering wide re-
ceiver Adam James, son of ESPN college football analyst Craig
James, to stand in an equipment room after Jones had suffered a
concussion.180  Also in December 2009, Mark Mangino, the second
177. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW, sec. 6.1.2.1 (4th ed.
2010) (discussing what due process generally requires).
178. See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157 (stating that “the well settled rule [is] that the
relations between a student and a private university are a matter of contract.”);
Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 2000) (holding that disciplined
student’s complaint governed by student handbook as matter of contract); Holert
v. Univ. of Chicago, 751 F.Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating that “university and
its students have a contractual relationship; the terms of their contract are gener-
ally set forth in the university’s catalogs and manuals”); Russell v. Salve Regina
Coll., 649 F.Supp. 391 (D.R.I. 1986) (arguing that “it is accepted law that relation-
ship between student and university is contractual in nature” (citations omitted));
Cloud v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 720 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1983) (pertaining to
plaintiff’s action seeking reinstatement from private university following discipli-
nary hearing governed by contract law); Coveney v. Pres. & Trustees of Coll. of
Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16 (Mass. 1983) (considering plaintiff’s action seeking dam-
ages for alleged wrongful expulsion governed by student handbook).
179. See Dan Wetzel, Maryland Guard Dez Wells Suing Xavier for Expulsion, YA-
HOO! SPORTS (Aug. 20, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/ncaab—maryland-
guard-dez-wells-suing-xavier-for-expulsion-021302176.html (discussing one former
private school student-athlete that sued school for expulsion).  In August 2013,
Maryland basketball player Dezmine Wells sued Xavier University after he had
been expelled for allegedly having sexually assaulted another student. Wells al-
leged that Xavier, a private university, breached its contract with Wells by failing to
follow the hearing and appeal process outlined in the Xavier Student Handbook.
See Complaint, Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F.Supp.3d 746 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013)
(No. 1:13–CV–00575).  Because Xavier is a private school, Wells could not assert a
claim that his constitutional right to due process had been violated. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”).
180. See Leach Fired Short of Tech’s Bowl Game, ESPN, Dec. 31, 2009, http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/bowls09/news/story?id=4781981 (discussing rationale be-
hind Texas Tech firing coach).
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winningest coach in Kansas history, was forced to resign after an
investigation by the Kansas athletic department revealed that
Mangino had consistently treated players, staff, and university em-
ployees with an inappropriate and abusive manner.181  In January
2010, Jim Leavitt, the winningest football coach in South Florida
history, was fired for having allegedly struck a player during half-
time of a game.182  As a last example, in April 2013, Rutgers basket-
ball coach Mike Rice was fired after practice footage was publicized
in which Rice was shown verbally abusing players, using anti-gay
slurs, and hurling basketballs at players.183
Those cases shined a negative spotlight on each school’s ath-
letic department and Athletic Director.  Questions inevitably came
wondering how it is that an institution of higher learning could em-
ploy, and gainfully employ, persons with such questionable charac-
ter, particularly when these were individuals theoretically
responsible for ensuring the growth and maturity of young men.
Not surprisingly, the Leach, Leavitt, and Rice cases all resulted in
various forms of litigation.184  In the Rice case, Rutgers Athletic Di-
rector, Tim Pernetti, a celebrated former Rutgers football player,
was also forced to resign.185  The perceived mistake Pernetti made
181. See Mangino out at Kansas, ESPN (Dec. 4, 2009), http://sports.espn.go
.com/ncf/news/story?id=4711389 (discussing how Kansas forced coach to resign
after evidence surfaced that he had been abusive).
182. See Leavitt Fired as South Florida Coach, ESPN (Jan. 8, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4807719 (reporting that one coach was
fired for striking player during half time).
183. See Steve Eder & Kate Zernike, Rutgers Leaders Are Faulted on Abusive
Coach, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/sports/
ncaabasketball/rutgers-fires-basketball-coach-after-video-surfaces.html?pagewanted
=1&_r=0 (reporting Rutgers coach was fired for being verbally abusive).
184. See Mike Leach Files Lawsuit Against ESPN, ESPN (Nov. 25, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5847181 (discussing Mike Leach’s lawsuit
against ESPN).  In January 2011, a Texas state court dismissed Leach’s lawsuit on
immunity grounds. See  Leach v. Texas Tech Univ., 335 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.
2011). See also Brian Bennett, Fired Leavitt Files Suit, Seeks Millions, ESPN (Mar. 15,
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4996720 (reporting that
Leavitt, after being fired, filed suit against South Florida).  In January 2011, Leavitt
settled his lawsuit against South Florida for $2.75 million. See Greg Auman, USF
Settles Ex-Coach Jim Leavitt’s Lawsuit at $2.75 Million, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011,
http://www.tampabay.com/sports/college/usf-settles-ex-coach-jim-leavitts-lawsuit-
for-275-million/1144945. See also Jeff Borzello, Report: Ex-Rutgers F Derrick Randall
Suing School, Mike Rice, CBSSPORTS, Dec. 9, 2013, http://www.cbssports.com/col-
legebasketball/eye-on-college-basketball/24369905/report-exrutgers-f-derrick-ran-
dall-suing-school-mike-rice (reporting that former Rutgers Forward had sued
Rutgers and Mike Rice after scandal).
185. See Kate Zernike & Steve Eder, Rutgers Tries to Calm Furor as More Officials
Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/06/sports/
ncaabasketball/athletic-director-tim-pernetti-is-out-in-rutgers-abuse-scandal.html
(evidencing that Rutgers Athletic Director forced to resign due to scandal).
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was that he had previously only suspended Rice for three games–as
opposed to terminating him–and not disclosing the extent of Rice’s
conduct.186
An important but perhaps less desirable role of Athletic Direc-
tors is fundraising.  As discussed earlier, only 23 of the top 100 ath-
letic departments operate at a profit.  Thus, in the ever-increasing
arms race of college athletics, every dollar obtained outside of a
university’s own budget is important.  While some schools are
blessed to have tremendously wealthy and generous donors, such as
when T. Boone Pickens donated $165 million to Oklahoma State
athletics in 2006,187 most Athletic Directors are forced to work tire-
lessly during capital campaigns to secure as many small donations
as possible for the department.  Athletic directors and head coaches
will often hold luncheons or dinners for which donors can “buy a
plate” to have the opportunity to network and hear the Athletic
Director or coach speak.  Many universities, particularly FBS institu-
tions, require “donations” on top of the actual season ticket price in
order to be considered for season tickets.188  For example, the Uni-
versity of Arkansas announced that the “Razorback Seat Value
Plan,” a fundraising initiative that awards priority seating at football
games based on donations to the athletic department, raised $6.5
million dollars.189
Athletic Directors not only feel pressure to secure donations,
but also to perform once they are received.  Big expectations often
come from big donations or gifts.  Bill Moos, ex-Athletic Director at
Oregon, assigned an employee whose chief responsibility was en-
gaging Phil Knight, the creator of Nike and a powerful alumnus.190
For sure, falling out with donors can have disastrous consequences
on an Athletic Director’s career.191  Donors will also often have a
186. See id. (discussing rationale for requesting that Athletic Director resign).
187. See Steve Wieberg, Tycoon’s $165M Gift to Oklahoma State Raises Both Hope
and Questions, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/col-
lege/2006-08-15-pickens-oklahoma-state-donation_x.htm (indicating that one do-
nor’s significant donation to Oklahoma State).
188. See generally Matt Jones, UA Fundraising Drive Raises $6.5 million for Athlet-
ics, ARKANSASONLINE (July 11, 2011), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2011/
jul/11/ua-fundraising-drive-raises-65-million-athletics/ (discussing how athletic de-
partments entice individuals to donate to particular sports programs).
189. See id. (discussing University of Arkansas “Razorback Seat Value Plan”).
190. See Michael Rosenberg, Nike’s Phil Knight has Branded Oregon into National
Power, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 7, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
writers/michael_rosenberg/01/06/oregon.knight/index.html#ixzz1WWisEmdh
(discussing Oregon’s plan to engage alumnus Phil Knight once he had given large
donations).
191. See id. (advancing that losing donors can have disastrous effect on Ath-
letic Director’s career).
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voice in who will be hired as an Athletic Director.  As Oklahoma
State President David Schmidly said when he was looking to replace
Athletic Director Harry Birdwell in 2005, “Why wouldn’t you want
an Athletic Director that your top donor likes?”192
In sum, Athletic Directors with a proper perspective under-
stand the important role the athletic department can play within a
university, and the scrutiny that comes along with it.  Athletic Direc-
tors must work to ensure the athletic department acts as a respecta-
ble and responsible citizen of the campus and displays a positive
face to the public at all times.
D. Compliance with Title IX
Title IX, passed in 1972, prohibits “any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance” from discriminating
on the basis of sex.193  In 1974, the then-United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare194 enacted regulations that spe-
cifically applied Title IX to “interscholastic, intercollegiate, club
[and] intramural athletics.”195  The regulations further clarified
that Title IX prohibits any person from being “treated differently
from another person” in the intercollegiate athletics context on the
192. See Wieberg, supra note 187 (discussing how donors have voice in choos-
ing Athletic Directors).
193. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1972) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of sex).  Specifically, Title IX states the
following: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1972).  All NCAA member institutions receive federal financial
assistance and thus are subject to Title IX. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
GENDER EQUITY, available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/S-
A%2BPamphlet.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (discussing facts about Title IX in
relation to NCAA).  Federal financial assistance may be received directly or indi-
rectly.  For example, colleges indirectly receive federal financial assistance when
they accept students who pay, in part, with federal financial aid directly distributed
to the students. See also Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984); Bob
Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F.Supp. 597, 603 (D. S.C. 1974), aff’d, 529 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1975).
194. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS, availa-
ble at http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (provid-
ing historical highlights of Department of Health and Human Services, in
particular evidencing that it was called “Department of Health, Education and
Welfare).  In 1979, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was divided
into the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human
Services. See id.
195. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (1975) (illustrating that certain regulations enacted
by Department of Health, Education and Welfare applied Title IX to intercollegi-
ate and intramural athletics).
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basis of sex.196  Moreover, the regulations declare that a recipient of
federal funding which operates intercollegiate athletics must “pro-
vide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.”197
There is an immense amount of data, research, and case law on
Title IX.  Here, we try to summarize the most important aspects of
Title IX about which an Athletic Director should be aware.
The positive effects of Title IX are undeniable.  Before the pas-
sage of Title IX, women composed only 7% of the total number of
athletic participants in high school and 16% in college.198  In the
2009-10 academic year, 45.6 % of Division I student-athletes were
female.199  Moreover, the total number of female intercollegiate
student-athletes has risen from approximately 30,000 before Title
IX to more than 190,000 in 2011-12.200
Nonetheless, compliance with Title IX can be confusing and
difficult.  In 1979, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights (“OCR”) published a Policy Interpretation of Title IX to as-
sist academic institutions with athletic programs in complying with
Title IX.201  OCR identified three areas in which a university must
demonstrate compliance:
1. Compliance in Financial Assistance (Scholarships)
Based on Athletic Ability: Pursuant to the regulation, the
governing principle in this area is that all such assistance
should be available on a substantially proportional basis to
196. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (directing that athletes cannot be treated differently
from one another on basis of sex).
197. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (providing that members of both sexes must be pro-
vided with equal opportunity).
198. See WONG, supra note 177, at 316 (evidencing that Title IX had a great R
impact on high school and university female athletics).
199. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, GENDER EQUITY REPORT 2004-
2010, 8 (2012), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/
GEQS10.pdf (providing statistics regarding female participation in university ath-
letic programs).
200. See SHARP Center for Women & Girls, Progress and Promise: Title IX at 40
Conference, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUNDATION, Feb. 2013, available at http://www
.womenssportsfoundation.org/en/home/research/articles-and-reports/title-ix-at-
40-conference (demonstrating positive impacts of Title IX forty years after its
enactment).
201. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION’S OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, A POLICY INTER-
PRETATION: TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (Dec. 11, 1979), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html (providing text of
Dep’t of Education’s policy interpretation). See also 44 C.F.R. § 714.13 (incorporat-
ing policy interpretation promulgated in Code of Federal Regulations); U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUCATION, READING ROOM (eFOIA Index), http://www2.ed.gov/about/of-
fices/list/ocr/publications.html#TitleIX-Pubs (providing list of Dep’t of Educa-
tion publications, including policy interpretation on Title IX).
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the number of male and female participants in the institu-
tion’s athletic program.
2. Compliance in Other Program Areas (Equipment and
supplies; games and practice times; travel and per diem,
coaching and academic tutoring; assignment and compen-
sation of coaches and tutors; locker rooms, and practice
and competitive facilities; medical and training facilities;
housing and dining facilities; publicity; recruitment; and
support services): Pursuant to the regulation, the gov-
erning principle is that male and female athletes should
receive equivalent treatment, benefits, and opportunities.
3. Compliance in Meeting the Interests and Abilities of
Male and Female Students: Pursuant to the regulation, the
governing principle in this area is that the athletic inter-
ests and abilities of male and female students must be
equally effectively accommodated.202
This directive from OCR has generally become known as the Three
Prong Test and is still applicable today.
In addition, the OCR outlined three factors in considering
whether an institution adequately accommodates the interests and
abilities of both sexes as required by Prong Three:
1. Whether intercollegiate level participation opportuni-
ties for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments?
2. Where the members of one sex have been and are un-
derrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether
the institution can show a history and continuing practice
of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive
to the developing interests and abilities of that sex?
3. Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot
show a continuing practice of program expansion such as
that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have
202. See A POLICY INTERPRETATION: TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
supra note 201 (identifying three areas in which universities must demonstrate
compliance with Title IX).
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been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program?203
Importantly, an institution only has to satisfy one of these criteria to
demonstrate it is accommodating the interests of male and female
students in compliance with Title IX.204  Nevertheless, it is clear
that determining whether a university has complied with Title IX
relies on subjective criteria that may be further comprised of innu-
merable data points.  Not surprisingly then, there has routinely
been litigation over whether a school was in compliance with Title
IX.205
Today, institutions should fairly easily be able to satisfy the first
two Prongs of examination: compliance in financial assistance and
compliance in other program areas.
To demonstrate compliance in financial assistance, a university
must allocate its scholarship dollars roughly equivalent to the pro-
portion of student-athletes of each gender.206  Thus, if 50% of a
school’s student-athletes are male, male student-athletes should re-
ceive 50% of the total scholarship dollars.207  However, where there
is an unexplained disparity of more than 1%, there is a strong pre-
sumption that the university is not in compliance.208  A common
203. See id. (discussing how universities can adequately comply with third
area).
204. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATH-
LETICS POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST, available at http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html (clarifying that each institution need
only satisfy one of three criteria in order to demonstrate that it is complying with
Title IX).
205. See, e.g., Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir.
1993); Roberts v. Colorado State University, 814 F.Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993);
Boucher v. Syracuse University, 164 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1999); Pederson v. Louisiana
State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Choike v. Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa. of
the State Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 06-cv-622, 2006 WL 2060576 (W.D. Pa. July 21,
2006); Miller v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 05-cv-764, 2008 WL 203025 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 22, 2008).
206. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 8.1.1.2 (demonstrating that universities R
must allocate its scholarship dollars equivalent to proportion of student-athletes).
207. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 8.1.1.2 (explaining that if 50% of student R
athletes are male and other 50% are female, then scholarship dollars must be
equally proportioned); see also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER:
BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY, (July 23, 1998), available at http://www2.ed
.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/bowlgrn.html [hereinafter “Bowling Green
State University”] (providing example of how U.S. Government handles com-
plaints regarding discrimination in allocating athletic scholarships).
208. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 8.1.1.2 (illustrating when disparity of R
more than 1%, strong presumption of non-compliance).
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acceptable explanation for a disparity is the difference in out-of-
state versus in-state tuition.209
To demonstrate compliance in other program areas, the OCR
examines 11 components:
(1) provision and maintenance;
(2) Scheduling of games and practice times;
(3) Travel and per diem allowances;
(4) Opportunity to receive academic tutoring and assign-
ment and compensation of tutors;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and assignment and
compensation of coaches;
(6) Provision of locker rooms and practice and competi-
tive facilities;
(7) Provision of medical and training facilities and
services;
(8) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(9) Publicity;
(10) Provision of support services; and
(11) Recruitment of student-athletes.210
Proper systems should enable an athletic department to pro-
vide equally to the different program areas.  An athletic department
should track and record the various relevant data for each of the 11
components and then compare that between the men’s and wo-
men’s teams, particularly where there is a team for each gender.
For example, the athletic department should ensure that the men’s
and women’s basketball teams have an equal amount of off days
between games, that the teams’ games are roughly the same times,
that the teams have the same amount of tutors, that the availability
and assignment coaching staffs are roughly equal in nature,211 that
the teams get to play and practice in the same facilities, that the
teams have the same access to trainers and medical staff, that the
209. See Bowling Green State University, supra note 207 (arguing that universi- R
ties can argue that disparity between female and male scholarships can be based
on in state versus out of state tuition).
210. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 8.1.1.2 (discussing 11 components that R
OCR examines to demonstrate compliance). See also OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUCATION, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR’S MANUAL (1990), available
at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/gender_equity/resource_materials/AuditMaterial/In-
vestigator%27s_Manual.pdf [hereinafter “TITLE IX INVESTIGATOR’S MANUAL”] (pro-
viding that OCR examines eleven components that can demonstrate compliance).
211. See TITLE IX INVESTIGATOR’S MANUAL, supra note 210, at 58 (evidencing R
that athletic departments are required to ensure equal access to all aspects of ath-
letic programs). So long as the female student-athletes are being provided equal
access to coaching, the coaches do not need to be compensated equally. See id.
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teams have the same access to housing and dining facilities, that the
public relations department pays equal attention to each team, and
that prospective recruits are treated equally when visiting the
campus.
Moreover, the OCR accepts disparities in the 11 components
above based on certain factors, such as the unique nature of the
particular sport, special circumstances of a temporary nature, the
need for greater funding for crowd control at more popular ath-
letic events, and, differences that have not yet been remedied but
that an institution is voluntarily working to correct.212
Probably the most difficult area to demonstrate is whether an
institution adequately accommodates the interests and abilities of
both sexes, Prong Three.  In April 2010, OCR advised that asking
the following three questions will help determine whether the inter-
ests of both sexes are being accommodated:
1. Is there unmet interest?
2. Is there sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport?
3. Is there a reasonable expectation of competition for
the team?213
These questions beg the question of how they can be answered.
OCR and the NCAA generally recommend the use of surveys to
students of the underrepresented sex (generally women) to deter-
mine their interest in athletics.214  However, it is important that the
survey response rate be sufficiently reliable.  In Barrett v. West Chester
University of Pennsylvania of the State System of Higher Education, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that a 39 percent survey response rate was too low to validate
the survey and, therefore, the school could not rely on the results to
demonstrate compliance with the equal accommodation prong.215
212. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 8.1.1.2 (evidencing that OCR accepts dis- R
parities in scholarships under certain situations).
213. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, EQUITY AND TITLE IX IN INTERCOL-
LEGIATE ATHLETICS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 20 (2011),
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/EQTI12.pdf
[hereinafter “EQUITY AND TITLE IX IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS”] (providing
three questions that will help determine whether interests of both sexes are being
accommodated).
214. See id. (illustrating that NCAA and OCR generally recommend that ath-
letic programs survey underrepresented sexes about their interest in athletics).
215. See Barrett v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa. of the State Sys. of Higher Educ.,
No. 03-cv-4978, 2003 WL 22803477 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2003) (holding that schools
cannot rely on 39% response rate to survey because that amount too low to vali-
date survey results).  In 2005, then-President George W. Bush instituted a new pol-
icy that allowed schools to use a simple survey of women as an evaluation of
43
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Schools face difficult choices if it is determined there is unmet
interest.  The most controversial way in which schools have tried to
comply with Title IX is by cutting men’s programs and therefore
equalizing the level of participation and expenditures between the
genders.  As a result, there have been several “reverse discrimina-
tion lawsuits.”  Most recently, in 2006, James Madison University de-
cided to eliminate seven men’s teams and three women’s teams to
bring the school into compliance with Title IX.216  A coalition of
coaches, student-athletes, fans, booster clubs, parents, and alumni
formed Equity in Athletics, Inc. (“EIA”), a Virginia non-profit cor-
poration to challenge the Title IX regulations and James
Madison.217  The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Virginia, and then the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, rejected EIA’s challenge to the Three Prong
Test and cited cases from Circuit Courts of Appeal across the coun-
try that have determined that schools are permitted to eliminate
men’s programs in order to comply with Title IX.218
whether females were being given equal opportunity to participate.  The policy
combined non-responses with negative responses, giving institutions an easier way
to avoid providing equal athletic opportunities for females.  In 2010, President Ba-
rack Obama repealed the policy.
216. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 291 Fed.Appx. 517
(4th Cir. 2008) (illustrating that, in some cases, schools need to remove athletic
teams to be in compliance with Title IX).
217. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88, 90
(W.D. Va. 2007) (discussing formation of Equity in Athletics, Inc.).
218. See Equity in Athletics, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d at 101 (citing that “[e]very
court, in construing the Policy Interpretation and the text of Title IX, has held that
a university may bring itself into Title IX compliance by increasing athletic oppor-
tunities for the underrepresented gender (women in this case) or by decreasing
athletic opportunities for the overrepresented gender (men in this case).”). See
also Neal v. Bd. of Tr. of the Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763, 769-770 (9th Cir. 1999);
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 n. 15 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter “Cohen
I”] (“[t]itle IX does not require that a school pour ever-increasing sums into its
athletic establishment. If a university prefers to take another route, it can also
bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark of the accommodation test by
subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing opportunities for the over-
represented gender while keeping opportunities stable for the underrepresented
gender (or reducing them to a much lesser extent).”); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[w]e recognize that in
times of economic hardship, few schools will be able to satisfy Title IX’s effective
accommodation requirement by continuing to expand their women’s athletics
programs . . . .  Financially strapped institutions may still comply with Title IX by
cutting athletic programs such that men’s and women’s athletic participation rates
become substantially proportionate to their representation in the undergraduate
population.”); Kelley v. Bd. of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating
that “And despite plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary, neither the regulation nor
the policy interpretation run afoul of the dictates of Title IX.”); Miami Univ. Wres-
tling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that decision
to eliminate men’s athletic programs did not violate Title IX, since “[t]he statute
44
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Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit recently rejected a clever attempt to enlarge the defini-
tion of female sports for Title IX purposes.  In Biediger v.
Quinnipiac,219 Quinnipiac women’s volleyball players challenged
the school’s 2009 decision to eliminate their team as a violation of
Title IX and further argued that the school’s decision to create, and
count for purposes of Title IX, a 30-person “competitive cheerlead-
ing” squad violated Title IX.220  The United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut found that “in terms of the team’s oper-
ating budget, benefits, services, and coaching staff, competitive
cheerleading was generally structured and administered by Quin-
nipiac’s athletics department in a manner consistent with the
school’s other varsity teams.”221  However, there were significant
differences that led the courts to find that the cheerleading squad
could not be counted for purposes of Title IX.  First, there were no
uniform rules for competitive cheerleading.222  Additionally, the
courts found that Quinnipiac’s cheerleading squad competed
against “a motley assortment of competitors, including collegiate
club opponents who did not receive varsity benefits, collegiate side-
line cheerleading teams, and all-star opponents unaffiliated with a
particular academic institution, some of whom may still have been
high school age.”223
Title IX compliance will always be best achieved through hard
work, attention to detail, and a desire to ensure equal participation
in athletics by both genders.  Fortunately, the NCAA regularly pub-
lishes very useful guidance on Title IX compliance.  In 2012, the
NCAA published Equity and Title IX in Intercollegiate Athletics – A
focuses on opportunities for the underrepresented gender, and does not bestow
rights on the historically overrepresented gender, and it is well-established that
classification by gender is not a per se violation of Title IX”); Chalenor v. Univ. of
N.D., 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[A]lthough Title IX does not
require proportionality, the statute does not forbid it either. And the gender make-
up of athletic participation is certainly relevant to a determination of whether a
school is in compliance with Title IX.”); Equity in Athletics, Inc., 291 Fed.Appx. at
523 (collecting same cases).
219. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (illustrating chal-
lenge to 2009 decision that eliminated Quinnipiac Volleyball team as violation of
Title IX).
220. See id. (challenging Quinnipiac’s decision to eliminate women’s volley-
ball team under Title IX).
221. See id. at 103 (illustrating that Quinnipiac was in compliance if competi-
tive cheerleading counted under Title IX).
222. See id. at 104 (directing that competitive cheerleading does not count
under Title IX).
223. See id. (illustrating that Quinnipiac’s cheerleading squad did not solely
compete against NCAA teams).
45
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Practical Guide for Colleges and Universities.224  The NCAA’s man-
ual is a comprehensive and comprehensible guide for all Title IX
issues and is a must read for any Athletic Director.  Additionally, the
NCAA mandates that each athletic department contain a Senior
Woman Administrator,225 who is generally responsible for advanc-
ing the interests of female student-athletes and ensuring the institu-
tion is complying with the spirit of Title IX.
There is no area of athletic department administration more
susceptible to legal wrangling than Title IX compliance.  It is im-
portant that an Athletic Director be educated on the issue, and
then proactive, rather than reactive, on compliance.
E. Negotiating Contracts
As discussed throughout this article, college athletic depart-
ments operate with tens of millions of dollars in cash flow.  Any
organization engaged in that level of business must ensure that it is
memorializing its agreements in well-written and enforceable con-
tracts, and that it and its counterparties are complying with their
contractual obligations.  We discuss the issues with contracted par-
ties of most importance to Athletic Directors: employment, market-
ing, apparel, facilities, and consultants.
Coaching contracts will of course be among the most conse-
quential and scrutinized contracts an Athletic Director will be in-
volved in negotiating.  While hiring a coach is complicated enough
simply from a competition standpoint, the economics make it even
more problematic.  To lure the most attractive coaches to their in-
stitution, Athletic Directors and the institutions have to be willing
to provide the coach with a contract commensurate with the mar-
ket, including in terms of salary, duration, and benefits.226  Not sur-
prisingly, in 2013, in forty states, the highest paid public employee
was either the head coach of the state university’s men’s basketball
or football team.227
224. See EQUITY AND TITLE IX IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 213 R
(showing that NCAA publishes this guide on compliance).
225. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 4.02.4. R
226. See Richard T. Karcher, The Coaching Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate
Athletics: Economic Implications and Legal Considerations, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2009) (arguing that to attract best coaches schools need to
provide most competitive contract).
227. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest-Paid Employee
a Coach? (Probably), DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013), http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-
your-states-highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228 (illustrating that state’s highest
paid employees are typically coaches).
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In an ideal world, the coach wins, the contract is fulfilled, and
then the parties extend the contract upon mutually agreeable
terms.  However, the landscape of college coaching contracts is far
from ideal.  There are two particular (and obvious) ways in which
college coaching contracts can become problematic: (1) the coach
does not win and is fired or (2) the coach does win and might leave
the university.
Coaching contracts–like any contract unless otherwise speci-
fied–are generally guaranteed.  In other words, the coach is gener-
ally entitled to receive the compensation promised by the contract
and for the duration promised by the contract.  Thus, even if the
coach has a dismal record after three years of a five-year contract,
he or she is entitled to the contracted compensation for years four
and five of the contract, even if terminated after year three.  Never-
theless, the school still has to hire a new coach and thus would end
up paying two coaches at the same time, one of whom would no
longer be performing any services for the university.
There are a couple of different ways universities try to deal with
paying a terminated coach.  The best outcome is to not pay the
coach at all.  However, this remedy is generally reserved for situa-
tions where the coach was terminated “for cause,” i.e., violated
some provision of the contract such as a morals clause228 or a clause
requiring the coach to comply with NCAA Bylaws.  For example, in
June 2003, the University of Washington fired football coach Rick
Neuheisel one season after he signed a contract extension through
2007 that was to pay him as much as $1.8 million annually.229
Neuheisel was fired after it was revealed that he and three friends
had participated in past NCAA men’s basketball tournament pools
and won over $12,000.230  NCAA Bylaws prohibit coaches and stu-
dent-athletes from gambling on college sports,231 but do not specifi-
228. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F.Supp. 717 (M.D.N.C.
2012) (providing example in which Pittsburgh Steelers running back Rashard
Mendenhall stated claim for breach of contract against clothing company which
attempted to terminate endorsement contract based on morals clause as result of
controversial statements made by Mendenhall).  A morals clause is a clause in
which the parties agree that one party can terminate the contract if the other party
engages in some type of criminal or morally questionable behavior.
229. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 9.2.5 (providing example of Rich R
Neuheisel’s termination for violating morals clause).
230. See id. (providing rationale that Neuheisel violated morals clause). .
231. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, art. 10.3 (evidencing that NCAA by- R
laws prohibit coaches and student-athletes from gambling on college sports).
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cally address such pools.232  Neuheisel claimed the university gave
him permission to participate in the pool.233  Neuheisel sued for
breach of contract when Washington refused to pay him his con-
tracted salary on the ground that he was fired with cause.234  The
case was ultimately settled for a reported $4.5 million,235 about half
of the approximately $9 million Neuheisel was set to earn under the
contract.236
Assuming the coach has done everything asked of him or her
besides win, the school will undoubtedly have to pay some money.
Coaching contracts generally include liquidated damages provi-
sions specifically stating that amount owed to the coach depending
on the date of termination.  Schools and coaches often negotiate
buyouts of the remaining amounts on the contract to avoid litiga-
tion of the amounts owed.237  Those negotiations are not always
successful and litigation is not uncommon.238
232. See id. (advancing that although coaches and student-athletes are prohib-
ited from gambling on college sports, pools are not specifically addressed in NCAA
bylaws).
233. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 9.2.5 (explaining that Neuheisel claimed R
university gave him permission to participate in pool).
234. See id. (evidencing that Neuheisel sued Washington for breach of
contract).
235. See id. (evidencing that Neuheisel’s case was settled for $4.5 million).
236. See O’Brien v. The Ohio State Univ., No. 2004–10230 2006 WL 571043
(Ohio Cl. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006) (providing similar case to Neuheisel).  Similarly, in
2004, Ohio State fired men’s basketball coach Jim O’Brien after he admitted to
giving $6,000 to Alex Radojevic, an Ohio State recruit, to help Radojevic’s family in
war-torn Serbia in 1999.  O’Brien sued for breach of contract.  Although the Court
of Claims of Ohio found that O’Brien likely committed an NCAA violation in
breach of his contact, O’Brien’s failure to report the violation was not a material
breach that would give Ohio State cause for termination. See id.  O’Brien was ulti-
mately awarded about $2.5 million in damages.
237. See Auburn Fires Gene Chizik, ESPN (Nov. 25, 2012), http://espn.go.com/
college-football/story/_/id/8674097/gene-chizik-fired-auburn-tigers (discussing
common trend to negotiate buyouts of remaining amounts on contracts to avoid
litigation).  In 2012, following a 3-9 season, including a 0-8 record in SEC games,
Gene Chizik was fired by Auburn University. Auburn Athletic Director Jay Jacobs
made the decision to fire Chizik without cause, resulting in a $7.5 million buyout
being owed to Chizik. See id.  Jacobs also dismissed a number of Chizik’s assistant
coaches, who were also entitled to buyout payments, pushing the total cost of Au-
burn’s move to $11.09 million. See id. See also Tennessee Dismisses Derek Dooley,
ESPN (Nov. 20, 2012), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8648445/
derek-dooley-tennessee-volunteers-return-another-season (providing example in
which Tennessee bought out Athletic Director Dooley’s contract).  Derek Dooley
was fired shortly before Chizik in November of 2012, during a season in which he
led the University of Tennessee to a 4-7 record, including an 0-7 SEC mark.  Ten-
nessee Athletic Director Dave Hart dismissed Dooley without cause, which trig-
gered a $5 million buyout payment to Dooley. See id.
238. See Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming
summary judgment for school on lawsuit against former coach concerning con-
tract’s liquidated damages provision); Northeastern Univ. v. Brown, No.
48
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A tricky issue exists over whether a coach resigns or is termi-
nated.  In some cases, where a coach resigns voluntarily, he or she
might not be entitled to any further compensation.  However, if the
coach is terminated, the remaining compensation is generally due.
But sometimes the school might force the coach to resign, which
on the one hand protects the coach’s reputation but also puts the
coach at risk of relinquishing amounts owed on the contract.
After the 2013 football season, longtime University of Texas
football coach Mack Brown announced his resignation, which was
reportedly forced by Texas President Bill Powers.239  At the time,
Brown’s contract ran through the 2020 season with approximately
$5 million in annual compensation.240  Brown’s contract with Texas
contemplated two departure scenarios.241
First, concerning Brown’s possible resignation, the contract
provided:
REASSIGNMENT
If Brown voluntarily relinquishes his duties as Head Foot-
ball Coach during the term of this agreement, he will be
reassigned to another significant position within the Uni-
versity with compensation set at a minimum of $500,000
annually and to be determined consistent with State law.
Second, concerning Brown’s possible termination, the contract
provided:
TERMINATION
The performance of Brown as head football coach will be
subject to periodic review by the Director and, at the dis-
cretion of the Director, Brown may be terminated as head
football coach.  If terminated, Brown will be compensated
according to the following terms:
20040827F, 2004 WL 616225 (Mass. Super. Mar. 11, 2004) (granting Northeastern
preliminary injunction against former coach).
239. See Tim Polzer, Report: Texas President Forsed Mack Brown to Resign, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 24, 2013), http://tracking.si.com/2013/12/24/mack-brown-
forced-resign/ (discussing Mack Brown’s resignation, which was reportedly forced
on him by President).
240. See Carter Strickland, Texas Approves Mack Brown Extension, ESPN (Jan. 26,
2012), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7507768/texas-long-
horns-approve-mack-brown-contract-extension (evidencing that Mack Brown’s
contract ran through 2020 season at approximately $5 million per year).
241. See Mack Brown’s Contract with UT, STATESMAN, available at http://me-
dia.cmgdigital.com/shared/news/documents/2013/12/26/mackContract13.pdf
(providing text of Mack Brown’s contract at University of Texas).
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Total Number of Annual
Date of Termination Compensation Payments
1/26/12 – 12/31/12 $3,500,000 5 (x $700,000)
1/1/13 – 12/31/14 $2,750,000 4 (x $687,500)
1/1/15 – 12/31/16 $2,250,000 3 (x $741,667)
1/1/17 – 12/31/17 $2,000,000 3 (x $666,667)
1/1/18 – 12/31/18 $1,500,000 2 (x $750,000)
1/1/19 – 12/31/19 $1,000,000 2 (x $500,000)
1/1/20 – 12/31/20 $ - 0 -
Which situation, however, did Brown’s departure fall into?  Not
surprisingly, the lines were blurred and Brown sought a buyout
greater than the $500,000 he was at least entitled to pursuant to the
Reassignment clause.242
One method by which universities can mitigate the damage
from a terminated coach is by an offset clause.  An offset clause
provides that in the event a terminated coach is hired by another
institution, the amounts owed to the coach by the terminating insti-
tution are lessened by the amounts being paid to the coach by the
new institution.  For example, in 2007, the University of Alabama
signed Nick Saban to an eight-year contract worth approximately
$32 million to be the school’s head football coach.243  Saban’s con-
tract included the following provision:
Offset Against Liquidated Damages.  It is agreed that the
Liquidated Damages paid by the University pursuant to
Section 5.01(e) hereof shall be offset and reduced on a
monthly basis by the gross compensation earned by
[Saban] personally or through business entities owned or
controlled by [Saban] from employment as a head or assis-
tant coach or as an administrator either at a college or
university or within a professional sports organization.
Thus, assuming Alabama had fired Saban after the fourth year
of the contract (which they did not do), they were still obligated to
pay him the approximately $4 million a year owed on his contract
for the remaining four years of the contract.244  But if Saban had
hypothetically returned to his first head coaching job at Toledo at a
242. See Mack Brown Negotiating Deal, ESPN (Dec. 28, 2013), http://espn.go
.com/college-football/story/_/id/10203648/texas-longhorns-coach-mack-brown-
negotiating-more-money-buyout-report-says (evidencing that Mack Brown sought
buyout).
243. See  Nick Saban Contract, University of Alabama, available at http://www.al
.com/alabamafootball/resources/saban-contract.pdf.
244. See id. sec. 5.01(e) (outlining obligations under Saban contract).
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hypothetical salary of $2,500,000 annually, the amount Alabama
would have been obligated to pay Saban would be decreased from
$4,000,000 to $1,500,000 annually.
The next scenario that must be contemplated is where the
coach is successful and becomes an attractive candidate to other
institutions or professional leagues.  How to handle this scenario
has received increased scrutiny in recent years as universities have
committed millions of dollars in salaries and resources to coaching
staffs only to see the coaches leave at the first opportunity for more
prestigious employment.245  Universities have essentially begun in-
cluding two types of clauses in coaching contracts to either prevent
these departures or to minimize the economic harm to the univer-
sity in the event of a departure.
First, a university might include a liquidated damages clause in
the coach’s contract, which will require the coach to pay an agreed-
upon sum of money to the school in the event the coach leaves, i.e.,
terminates his or her contract, prior to its completion.  For exam-
ple, the University of Kentucky and head basketball coach John
Calipari agreed to the following provision:
8. Termination by Coach.  In the event Coach terminates
this Agreement (unless such termination results from Uni-
versity’s material breach of this Agreement), Coach shall
make the payment of liquidated damages within ninety
(90) days as follows:
(a) Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000) if the termina-
tion occurs any time within the first (1st) year of this
Agreement;
(b) Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000) if the termina-
tion occurs any time within the second (2nd) year of
this Agreement;
(c) One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) if the termina-
tion occurs any time within the third (3rd) year of this
Agreement;
(d) Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000) if the
termination occurs any time within the fourth (4th)
year of this Agreement;
245. See Karcher, supra note 226 (discussing issue of what athletic programs R
should do in event that coaches are offered more prestigious employment at
length). See also Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Practical
Perspective, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127 (2001) (discussing issue of what athletic
programs should do in event that coaches are recruited for more prestigious
employment).
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(e) If the termination occurs anytime during the fifth
(5th) year of this Agreement or thereafter, Coach will
not be required to pay the University any liquidated
damages.246
The alternative to a liquidated damages clause is what is some-
times referred to as a “loyalty bonus.”  A loyalty bonus is generally a
lump sum payment made to the coach if the coach stays for a cer-
tain number of years.  For example, Rick Pitino signed a contract to
become the men’s basketball coach at the University of Louisville in
2001.247  Pitino’s contract called for a $5 million bonus if he com-
pleted the six-year contract,248 which he did.249
Not surprisingly, some of the most important contractual issues
with which an Athletic Director must handle involve attempting to
maximize revenue streams for the university.  Marketing is one area
where universities seek to create revenue.  Marketing revenue gen-
erally comes about where a corporation agrees to pay the university
a sum of money in exchange for naming rights to facilities or
events, signage at facilities and events, or the right to use the uni-
versity’s name or logos in association with the corporation or its
products.
Universities generally hire marketing firms specializing in this
type of work to help market and maximize revenue from the
school’s inventory of sponsorship opportunities.  These firms also
work to sell radio and television rights on behalf of the school.  Per-
haps the most powerful firm in this arena is IMG College.250  IMG
College represents 83 Division I institutions, the NCAA, and eight
conferences in efforts to generate revenue on behalf of those
groups.251  In 2009, Ohio State sold its media and marketing rights
246. See WONG, supra note 177, Exhibit 9.2 (presenting copy of Calipari’s R
contract).
247. See, e.g., Pitino Says ‘Yes’, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar., 21, 2001), available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/news/2001/03/21/pi-
tino_louisville/ (providing example of Louisville coach that was provided with loy-
alty bonus for signing contract for men’s basketball).
248. See WONG, supra note 177, sec. 9.2.5 (explaining loyalty bonus that Coach R
Pitino received).
249. Pitino led Louisville to the 2013 National Championship and is still Lou-
isville’s coach as of the date of publication.
250. See IMG COLLEGE, http://www.imgcollege.com/ (last visited Nov. 25,
2014) (providing webpage for most powerful marketing firm).
251. See IMG, Our Properties: Colleges and Universities, IMG COLLEGE, http://
www.imgcollege.com/our-properties/colleges-universities (last visited Nov. 25,
2014) (evidencing that IMG College represents Division I universities).
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to IMG College for a guarantee of $110 million over 10 years,252
providing Ohio State with a considerable and reliable source of
revenue.
An Athletic Director must be vigilant in ensuring that the
school’s marketing partner is creating the revenue the Athletic Di-
rector believes it should.  In April 2013, Rutgers’ then-Athletic Di-
rector Tim Pernetti chose to pay $7 million to its marketing firm,
Nelligan Sports Marketing, to end their 13-year partnership and
buy out the remaining four years on the Rutgers-Nelligan con-
tract.253  Pernetti had previously put Nelligan on notice that it was
“underperforming” on its contract.254  A few months later, Rutgers
signed an 11-year, $65 million contract with IMG College.255
Another important source of potential revenue for athletic de-
partments is apparel.  Companies such as Nike, Adidas, Reebok,
and Under Armour battle fiercely for the opportunity to cloak a
school’s student-athletes and coaches in their gear.  From an Ath-
letic Director’s perspective, not only can the athletic department
receive free uniforms and equipment, the apparel company might
also pay for the right to be the official apparel company of the
university.
The most interesting examples of apparel contracts in col-
legiate athletics are the contract between Nike and the University of
Oregon and the contract between Under Armour and the Univer-
sity of Maryland.
Oregon track coach Bill Bowerman and Phil Knight, a former
Oregon runner, formed Nike in the 1960s.256  Since that time, Ore-
252. See Ohio State Inks Marketing, Media Rights Deal with IMG Sports, SPORTS
BUS. DAILY, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/
2009/03/Issue-133/Sponsorships-Advertising-Marketing/Ohio-State-Inks-Market-
ing-Media-Rights-Deal-With-IMG-College.aspx (reporting that Ohio State sold its
marketing and media rights to IMG).
253. See Tom Luicci, Rutgers Paid $7 Million to End Marketing Deal with Nelligan
Sports, N.J.COM (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.nj.com/rutgersbasketball/index.ssf/
2013/04/rutgers_to_pay_7_million_to_ex.html (evidencing that Rutgers decided
to end its partnership with Nelligan Sports and bought out last four years of con-
tract); Brendan Prunty, A Big Deal for Rutgers: Partnership with IMG College will be
Worth $65 Million Over 11 Years, N.J.COM. July 25, 2013, http://www.nj.com/rutgers
football/index.ssf/2013/07/a_big_deal_for_rutgers_partnersip_with_img_college
_will_be_worth_65_million_over_11_years.html (discussing Rutgers’ new partner-
ship with IMG Sports).
254. See Luicci, supra note 253 (evidencing that Nelligan Sports had been put R
on notice that it was “underperforming”).
255. See Prunty, supra note 253 (discussing Rutgers’ new deal with IMG R
Sports).
256. See Richard Goldstein, Bill Bowerman, 88, Nike Co-Founder, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/27/sports/bill-bower
man-88-nike-co-founder-dies.html (discussing formation of Nike in 1960s).
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gon and Nike have had a mutually beneficial relationship, which
includes Oregon’s receipt of Nike gear and hundreds of millions of
dollars in donations from Knight.257  In 2009-10, Oregon athletics
received more than $2 million in gear and $500,000 in cash from
Nike.258  Moreover, both Nike and Oregon have drawn attention
for the inventive, unique, and stylish (and sometimes absurd) foot-
ball uniforms created by Nike.259  Since approximately the mid-
2000s, the Oregon football team has worn a newly styled uniform
for every game,260 drawing considerable media attention to the
program.
Under Armour was founded in 1996 by Kevin Plank, a former
University of Maryland football player.261  In 2008, Maryland and
Under Armour signed a five-year deal worth $17.5 million,262 creat-
ing a relationship similar to that of Oregon and Nike.  Under Ar-
mour began to outfit the entire Maryland athletic department with
equipment and apparel, including new and unique uniforms for
the football team.263  In 2014, Maryland and Under Armour signed
a ten-year extension worth a reported $34 million.264
257. See Rachel Bachman & Brett Hunsberger, Phil Knight’s Influence Trans-
forms University of Oregon Athletics, THE OREGONIAN, May 4, 2008, http://www.ore
gonlive.com/sports/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/sports/1209711308201850.xml&
coll=7&thispage=2; http://uniformcritics.com/football/college/oregon-ducks/
(discussing relationship between University of Oregon and Phil Knight of Nike).
258. See Rachel Bachman, University of Oregon, Under Order From State Attorney
General, Releases Terms of Nike Deal, THE OREGONIAN, http://blog.oregonlive.com/
behindducksbeat/2010/05/university_of_oregon_under_ord.html (May 3, 2010,
8:53 PM) (revealing Oregon Athletics’ receipt of gear and cash from Nike).
259. See Oregon Ducks Football Uniforms, UNIFORM CRITICS, http://uniformcrit-
ics.com/football/college/oregon-ducks/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (illustrating
Oregon Ducks uniforms created with help of Nike).
260. See Eric Adelson, Uniform Rotation Revolutionized by Oregon Ducks has
Jumped the Shark, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 21, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/
ncaaf—uniform-rotation-revolutionized-by-oregon-has-jumped-the-shark.html (in-
dicating that since start of partnership, Oregon Ducks have had particularly stylish
uniforms).
261. See David Colman, Muscling Into the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/07/fashion/07ARMOUR.html?page
wanted=all (discussing founding of Under Armour).
262. See Under Armour Inks 5-Year, $17.5M Deal With Univ. of Maryland, SPORTS
BUS. DAILY, Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/
2008/09/Issue-239/Sponsorships-Advertising-Marketing/Under-Armour-Inks-5-
Year-$175M-Deal-With-Univ-Of-Maryland.aspx (reporting five year deal between
University of Maryland and Under Armour).
263. See Alex Prewitt, Maryland Football Unveils New Red “Pride” Uniforms, WASH-
INGTON POST, Sept. 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/terrapins-in-
sider/wp/2013/09/19/maryland-football-unveils-new-red-pride-uniforms/
(discussing how Under Armour began outfitting entire University of Maryland ath-
letic department).
264. See Andrew Emmer, University of Maryland Signs 10-Year Extension with
Under Armour, TESTUDO TIMES, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.testudotimes.com/2014/
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The next set of contracts for an Athletic Director to be mindful
of concerns stadiums, arenas and similar facilities.  If a school is
fortunate enough to own its stadiums and arenas, the school can
turn the facility into a revenue source by renting the facility out for
other events, such as concerts.  To do so, schools often contract
with a facility management firm that specializes in operating arenas
and in securing events at the arenas, such as SMG,265 Global Spec-
trum,266 or AEG Facilities.267  These firms also help manage the
multitude of contractual arrangements necessary to operate a facil-
ity, including, but not limited to employees, vendors, and
concessionaires.
Some schools, however, do not own the facilities in which they
play.  In which case, the Athletic Director may be responsible for
negotiating leases permitting the school’s athletic teams to play in a
particular stadium or arena.  For example, in 2003, the Philadel-
phia Eagles and Temple University reached a 15-year contract for
Temple’s football team to play at the Eagles’ 68,000-seat Lincoln
Financial Field.268  Since that time, Temple football has had mixed
success on the field,269 but has suffered annual losses of approxi-
mately $2.5 million, causing speculation that Temple should look
to build its own football stadium.270
1/6/5280562/maryland-under-armour-deal-contract (discussing new 10-year deal
in 2014).
265. See SMG: WORLDWIDE ENTERTAINMENT AND CONVENTION VENUE MANAGE-
MENT, http://smgworld.com/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (illustrating example of
facilities management firm that creates additional revenue for schools through
other uses of athletic venues).
266. See GLOBAL SPECTRUM, http://www.global-spectrum.com/region/en/in-
dex.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (providing example of facilities management
firm).
267. See Facilities, AEG WORLDWIDE, http://www.aegworldwide.com/facilities/
facilities (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (providing example of facilities management
firm).
268. See Lincoln Financial Field, OWLSPORTS.COM, http://www.owlsports.com/
sports/2009/8/31/FB_0831092543.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (explaining
deal between Eagles and Temple to allow Temple’s football team to play at Lin-
coln Financial Field).
269. Temple has posted a 45-87 record since 2003, and compiled six straight
losing seasons between 2003 and 2008. Between 2009 and 2011 the Owls posted a
26-12 record, but fell to just 6-17 the following two years (2012-13). See TEMPLE
UNIVERSITY, 2013 TEMPLE FOOTBALL MEDIA GUIDE: RECORDS 226 (2013), available at
http://owlsports.com/documents/2013/8/1/201-260_Records_ALL.pdf?id=2657
(listing team and individual Temple Football records from 1894 through 2012
season).
270. See Jere Longman, After Years of Failure, an Awakening at Temple, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/sports/ncaafoot-
ball/24temple.html?pagewanted=all (demonstrating that after football success,
Temple should build its own football team).
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Another interesting example is that of the University of Massa-
chusetts (“UMass”) football team.  After considerable success at the
FCS level,271 UMass joined the FBS level beginning with the 2012
season.272  The lease negotiated by UMass was essential to UMass’
promotion.  UMass reached a deal with Kraft Sports Group273 to
play its football games rent-free for five years in Gillette Stadium,
the home of the New England Patriots.274  In exchange, Kraft
Sports Group would split the game revenues with UMass.275  With-
out the rent-free arrangement, the transition to FBS football likely
would have proven too expensive for UMass.
The last area of contracts we discuss concerns outside consul-
tants.  As in any industry, from time-to-time athletic departments
require the expertise of an individual or a firm that exceeds the
skill or knowledge of the athletic department’s employees.  Not sur-
prisingly, athletic departments hire outside consultants concerning
several of the important topics already discussed herein.
For example, colleges increasingly use search firms to help
them fill head coaching vacancies.276  Search firms such as Carr
Sports Associates, Inc., Korn/Ferry International, and Parker Exec-
utive Search charge fees upwards of $90,000 to help athletic depart-
271. See Bill Pennington, Big Dream, Rude Awakening, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/sports/ncaafootball/universities-
chase-big-time-glory-in-fbs.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&&pagewanted=all (discuss-
ing UMass’s rise to FBS football, as well as other similar programs).  UMass regu-
larly qualified for the Division I-AA playoffs, making six appearances and winning
six conference championships between 1990 and 2007.  The Minutemen won the
1998 Division I-AA championship, and returned to the championship game in
2006 against Appalachian State. See No. 3 UMass Plays For 2nd NCAA Football Title
Against No. 1 App State, UMASS ATHLETICS  (Dec. 11, 2006), available at http://www
.umassathletics.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/121106aab.html.
272. See Jack Carey, UMass Football to Join FBS, Mid-American Conference, USA
TODAY, Apr. 20, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/
2011-04-20-umass-football-move_N.htm (discussing UMass’s jump from FCS to FBS
football)
273. See THE KRAFT GROUP, http://www.thekraftgroup.com/sports_entertain
ment/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (outlining The Kraft Group’s organization and
assets—the New England Patriots, New England Revolution, and Gillette Sta-
dium—and Gillette Stadium as venue for “bringing world class events to New
England”).
274. See Kraft Offering Gillette Stadium Rent-Free Is Key to UMass Move, SPORTS
BUS. DAILY, Apr. 11, 2011, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/
2011/04/21/Colleges/UMass.aspx (discussing deal in which UMass can play at
Gillette Stadium rent free for five years).
275. See id. (illustrating that in exchange for free rent, UMass will split profits
with Kraft).
276. See Dana O’Neil, Need a Coach? There’s a Firm for That?, ESPN (Aug. 2,
2013), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/9524814/search-
firms-take-lead-filling-head-coaching-vacancies-college-athletics (explaining that
colleges often use firms to fill head coach vacancies).
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ments fill high profile coaching vacancies.277  The search firms are
generally more aware of the fluid and rapidly moving market for
the coaches and can also work to obtain information that their uni-
versity-clients might not be able to obtain.278  In addition, the
search firms also perform background checks on the candidates in
an attempt to avoid the embarrassments that come from hiring a
coach who has lied about his or her resume or has engaged in unsa-
vory behavior.279
Athletic departments are also increasingly hiring outside con-
sultants to help their student-athletes deal with the amateur-to-pro-
fessional transition process, including the selection of agents.
Cornerstone Sports Consulting, run by Joe Mendes, a former NFL
team and league executive and talent evaluator, was one of the first
firms to offer these services.280  These types of consultants help the
athletic departments bridge the gap to the professional ranks to
better gauge student-athletes’ potential and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, handle the agent process.  The consultants can serve as the
intermediary between a student-athlete and an agent to ensure that
the process does not overwhelm the student-athlete and that the
agents are conducting themselves appropriately.
Lastly, schools also hire outside consultants to investigate and
help resolve possible NCAA Bylaw violations.  Two law firms in par-
ticular have established themselves as experts in this area: Bond,
Schoeneck & King, PLLC,281 and Ice Miller LLP.282  These firms
have a long history of understanding NCAA Bylaws, the way in
277. See id. (explaining that colleges often use firms to fill head coach
vacancies).
278. See id. (advancing benefit of using search firms).
279. See John W. Fountain & Edward Wong, Notre Dame Coach Resigns After 5
Days and a Few Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/
15/sports/notre-dame-coach-resigns-after-5-days-and-a-few-lies.html (evidencing
benefit of search firms completing background checks of potential candidates for
vacancies).  In 2001, Notre Dame football coach George O’Leary resigned only five
days into the job after it was revealed O’Leary had exaggerated his accomplish-
ments as a football player at the University of New Hampshire and falsely claimed
to have earned a master’s degree in education from New York University. See id.
280. See CORNERSTONE SPORTS CONSULTING, http://www.cornerstonesports
.com/team.html (last visited June 15, 2010) (discussing this firms intent to offer
services to universities for amateur athletes). See also Liz Mullen, Some Agents Ques-
tion Former NFL Exec’s Role with Schools, SPORTS BUS. J. (Aug. 24, 2009), www.sport-
sbusinessjournal.com/article/63356 (highlighting that some firms offer services to
universities to help their amateur athletes).
281. See Collegiate Sports, BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, available at http://www
.bsk.com/practices/4-collegiate-sports (illustrating example of law firm that can
help in area of NCAA Bylaw investigations)
282. See Collegiate Sports and NCAA Compliance, ICE MILLER, http://www.icemil-
ler.com/industries/collegiate-sports-and-ncaa-compliance/ (last visited Mar. 12,
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which the Bylaws are interpreted and applied by the NCAA, and
representing universities before the COI and IAC.  Consequently,
these firms are adept at analyzing an athletic department’s opera-
tions to ensure compliance with NCAA Bylaws and helping univer-
sity’s resolve problems where there has been noncompliance.
IV. THE QUALIFICATIONS, DEMOGRAPHICS AND CAREER PATHS OF A
DIVISION I ATHLETIC DIRECTOR
In order to identify any trends in the population of FBS Ath-
letic Directors over the last 20 years, information has been collected
from a variety of sources for three sample school years: 1989-90,
1999-00, and 2013-14.  The data regarding the Athletic Directors
appears to support the hypothesis that universities are moving to-
ward hiring individuals who have significant business experience,
either in an athletic department or in another industry.  Other
trends also appeared in the data, with the overarching theme that
experience in sport is appearing to become less important overall.
A. Collegiate Playing Experience
How important is college athletics playing experience for an
Athletic Director?  In 1989-90, it seemed to be very important; 88%
of FBS Athletic Directors played a sport in college.  More recently,
it still seems to be an important factor with 57% of the Athletic
Directors in 2013-14 having collegiate playing experience.  How-
ever, as this 31 percentage point decrease demonstrates, it may not
be as important as it once was.
The decline in college playing experience of Division I Athletic
Directors appears to have been continual over the twenty-year pe-
riod.  The percentage of Athletic Directors with collegiate playing
experience in 1999-00 dropped to 70%, before it again fell to 57%
for the 2013-14 school year.  The sharp decrease appears to be con-
sistent with the general perception that Division I athletic depart-
ments are beginning to focus more on business-related
qualifications of potential applicants.  That is not to say that college
athletes are discriminated against in the hiring process, or even that
they no longer benefit from a form a preferential treatment.  Ac-
cording to the NCAA, there are over 450,000 NCAA athletes rang-
ing across all three divisions.283  The National Center for Education
2014) (providing example of law firm that can help in area of NCAA Bylaw
investigations).
283. See Who We Are, supra note 11 (outlining that there are 450,000 NCAA R
athletes across three divisions).
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Statistics estimates that there will be roughly 18.2 million students
enrolled in degree granting institutions in the fall of 2012.284
Therefore, of the general population with at least some college ex-
perience, roughly 2% have had athletic experience at the collegiate
level.  This is far less than the two-thirds of Athletic Directors with
such experience.
B. Collegiate Coaching Experience
Coaching experience in college has long been considered one
of the potential stepping-stones to becoming an Athletic Director.
Some of the most recognizable names in college sport administra-
tion, such as Barry Alvarez and Debbie Yow, were long time coaches
prior to becoming Athletic Directors.285  In 2013-14, 20% of Ath-
letic Directors were a college head coach at some point in their
careers.
However, the prevalence of head coaching experience among
Division I Athletic Directors has decreased by more than half since
1989-90, when 63% of those Athletic Directors who were sampled
had head coaching experience.  This decline was consistent over
the three periods studied; about half of the Athletic Directors in
1999-00 had head coaching experience prior to becoming an Ath-
letic Director.
The number of years of coaching experience (head and assis-
tant) also dropped over the sample period, although not signifi-
cantly.  In 1989-90, the 63% of Athletic Directors who had head
coaching experience averaged 11.78 years as a coach.286  By 1999-
00, when only half of the Athletic Directors had head coaching ex-
perience in the collegiate ranks, the number of years they had
coached remained roughly the same at 11.53.  Despite the precipi-
tous drop of Athletic Directors with coaching experience in 2013-
14, the experience they had remained roughly level at 11.39 years.
284. NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
2010, 282 (2011) (listing number of students enrolled in degree granting
institutions).
285. Barry Alvarez is the current Athletic Director at the University of Wiscon-
sin.  Alvarez became Athletic Director in 2004, but was also Wisconsin’s head foot-
ball coach from 1990–2005, during which time he led the Badgers to 118 wins and
three Rose Bowl victories.  Debbie Yow is the current Athletic Director at North
Carolina State University.  Yow has been an Athletic Director since 1990 (begin-
ning with Saint Louis University), after a successful ten-year women’s basketball
coaching career.
286. This number is inclusive of both head coaching positions and assistant
coaching positions, and only factors in those Athletic Directors who were head
coaches at some point prior to becoming an Athletic Director.
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Looking at recent hiring patterns further reinforces this trend.
151 current Athletic Directors were hired by Division I schools be-
tween 2009 and 2014, but only nine were first-time Athletic Direc-
tors with head coaching experience.
Collegiate 
Coaching 
Experience 
College Head Coach Average Years Coached 
1989-1990 63% 11.78
1999-2000 50% 11.53
2013-2014 20% 11.39
C. Past Athletic Director Experience
In this section, we identify two trends: (1) that the percentage
of Athletic Directors with previous job experience has grown stead-
ily over the twenty-year period and (2) that the average number of
years of prior experience increased over the same time frame.
These two trends may be at least partially explained by the chang-
ing nature of FBS athletics and the athletic departments of the
member institutions.  The growing disparity among the “elite”
NCAA members, both interdivisional differences and intradivi-
sional differences, is at its greatest point in the history of collegiate
athletics.  As a result, the importance of remaining at the top of the
Division I FBS pyramid, at least as it relates to revenue generation,
has never been greater.  This places increased pressure on the uni-
versity, and thereby the Athletic Director, to deliver on-the-field
performance and financial results.  These pressures, which have
only increased over the twenty-year period, have likely forced uni-
versities to look towards Athletic Directors with proven track
records of success at other institutions.
For example, Gene Smith is currently the Athletic Director of
one of the largest athletic programs in the nation at the Ohio State
University.  Before taking the reins at Ohio State, Smith spent time
at Eastern Michigan, Iowa State, and Arizona State University.287
Then-President Karen Holbrook recognized his past experience
was an important factor in his hiring at such a critical juncture, stat-
ing, “Ohio State is hiring a well-respected A.D. with a track record
of success in all facets of athletics management and student-athlete
287. See Player Bio: Gene Smith, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES, http://www.ohios-
tatebuckeyes.com/genrel/smith_gene00.html (last visited Sep. 6, 2011) (providing
resume of Gene Smith).
60
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol22/iss1/1
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 61 31-MAR-15 13:44
2015] NCAA DIVISION I ATHLETIC DIRECTORS 61
achievement. He is a nationally respected A.D. who will be a tre-
mendous leader for our program.”288
In 1989-90, 35% of Division I Athletic Directors had previous
Athletic Director experience.  The average number of years of ex-
perience for those Athletic Directors was only 7.38.  When taking
this number in conjunction with the 63% of Athletic Directors who
were previously coaches, it suggests that many athletic departments
may have been more concerned with previous experience coaching
a sport than administering a department.
By 1999-00, both the percentage of Athletic Directors with ex-
perience and the length of that experience increased.  44% of the
Division I Athletic Directors had previous experience.  The years of
experience also rose, up 1.35 to 8.73 years.  Some Athletic Directors
spent a significant amount of time at one institution before moving
on, such as Laing Kennedy, who spent 11 years as the Athletic Di-
rector at Cornell before taking the same position at Kent State.289
Others moved around more frequently.  Ron Wellman was the Ath-
letic Director at Wake Forest in 1999-00, after spending five years at
Illinois State, one year at the University of Minnesota-Mankato, and
four years at Elmhurst College.290
Finally, in 2013-14, the percentage of Athletic Directors with
previous experience increased to 39%.  That is, 39% of the Athletic
Directors were in at least their second stint.  However, the total
years of past experience increased to 10.41 years.
It is interesting to note that over this same amount of time, the
average number of years an Athletic Director had been in his or her
current position remained roughly level over the twenty-year sam-
ple.  In 1989-90, Athletic Directors had been on the job for an aver-
age of 6.35 years.  This number slipped to 6.10 years in 1999-00, but
then rose again to 6.796 by 2013-14.  This suggests that while
schools appear to be hiring more Athletic Directors with previous
experience, they do not seem to be shortening those Athletic Direc-
tors’ tenures.
288. See Steve Helwagen, Smith Introduced as OSU’s Eighth AD, FOX SPORTS
(Mar. 5 2005), http://ohiostate.scout.com/2/357408.html (reporting Gene Smith
as Athletic Director of Ohio State).
289. See Laing Kennedy, KENT STATE ATHLETICS, http://kentstatesports.com/
staff.aspx?staff=89 (last visited Sep. 6, 2011) (providing that some Athletic Direc-
tors spend long time periods at one institution before moving on).
290. See Wake Forest’s Ron Wellman Named to NCAA Men’s Basketball Committee,
DEMON DEACON ATHLETICS (Feb. 20, 2009), http://wakeforestsports.cstv.com/
sports/m-baskbl/spec-rel/022009aab.html (providing example of one Athletic Di-
rector that moves on more frequently).
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Previous AD 
experience 
% with 
experience 
Avg. Total Years 
of experience Years as AD 
1989-1990 35% 7.38 6.35 
1999-2000 44% 8.73 6.10 
2013-2014 39% 10.41 6.79 
D. Business Experience
The percentage of Athletic Directors with some business expe-
rience has grown substantially over the last twenty years.  For pur-
poses of this Article, “business experience” is defined to include
private sector business experience or growth through the ranks of
the athletic department in development, marketing, fundraising, or
other business-related positions.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify a single reason for
trends that take place over twenty-plus-years.  However, it is likely
that the increased growth in revenues discussed throughout this Ar-
ticle has instigated the need for candidates with significant business
experience backgrounds both in and outside the athletic depart-
ment.  In aggregate, only 36% of those Athletic Directors surveyed
in 1989-90 had business experience.  This increased to 60% in 1999-
00.  By 2013-14, 93% of the Athletic Directors have had some sort of
business experience prior to serving as an Athletic Director.  This is
a total increase of almost 140% over the 1989-90 numbers.
The availability of information for Athletic Directors in 2013-14
allowed a closer examination into the breakdown of this business
experience.  For example, 83% of the Athletic Directors in 2013-14
had some prior “business track” experience.  That is, the individual
spent time within an athletic department in a position that entailed
business-like responsibilities, as identified earlier.  For example,
before Lawrence (Bubba) Cunningham became the Athletic Direc-
tor at the University of North Carolina, he spent 15 years at Notre
Dame as an assistant Athletic Director, business manager, and tick-
eting and marketing manager.291  Kirby Hocutt had a similar expe-
rience at Oklahoma and Kansas State prior to being named Athletic
Director at Baylor.292
291. See Bubba Cunningham, TULSA, http://www.tulsahurricane.com/genrel/
cunningham_bubba00.html (last visited Sep. 3, 2011) (providing example of
Atheltic Director who has prior business experience).
292. See Tom Collins, BALL STATE UNIVERSITY (Dec. 9, 2006), http://ball-
statesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=14200&ATCLID=717909 (provid-
ing example of one individual who had business experience before becoming
Athletic Director).  Tom Collins was hired in Development at Arizona State Uni-
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Another 17% of the Athletic Directors in 2013-14 went from
unrelated business to the athletic department in a role other than
Athletic Director.  For example, Tom Wistrcill was the vice presi-
dent of sales and marketing for VarsityOnline.com and a general
manager of the St. Louis Quest (women’s professional volleyball)
prior to moving into college athletics at Wisconsin where he was the
general manager of Badger Sports Properties.293  Steve Orsini spent
10 years in administration with the Dallas Cowboys before taking a
position as an associate Athletic Director, working his way through
Georgia Tech and the United States Naval Academy before becom-
ing SMU’s Athletic Director.294
Finally, 10% of Athletic Directors moved directly from a non-
athletic department position outside the university to the position
of Athletic Director.  Perhaps the most familiar of these hires is
Dave Brandon, who became the Athletic Director at the University
of Michigan in 2010 after stepping down as the chairman of the
board, chief executive officer, and manager of pizza giant Dom-
ino’s.  He was not completely disconnected from the University,
however, as he also served on the Board of Regents for the Univer-
sity of Michigan from 1998-2006.  President Mary Sue Coleman spe-
cifically referenced Brandon’s business experience as a reason for
his hire, stating that Brandon’s “widely acclaimed leadership skills,
business acumen, long-term involvement with the university and
personal knowledge of the challenges and rewards of being a stu-
dent athlete, David Brandon is an ideal candidate for Athletic
Director.”295
Business 
experience 
Bus. to 
AD 
Bus. within
dpt. 
Bus. to dpt.
(non-AD) 
Total bus. 
to AD 
1989-1990 - - - 36% 
1999-2000 - - - 60% 
2013-2014 10% 83% 17% 93% 
versity in 2013. See Press release, Sun Devil Athletics, He’s Back! Welcome Back
T.C.! (July 23, 2013), available at http://www.thesundevils.com/ViewAr-
ticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=30300&ATCLID=208783760 (discussing hiring of Tom
Collins at Arizona State University).
293. Wistrcill was also the commissioner of two NCAA Division II conferences
in the 1990s.
294. See Steve Orsini, SMU MUSTANGS, http://www.smumustangs.com/genrel/
orsini_steve00.html (last visited Sep. 13, 2014) (providing resume of Steve Orsini).
295. See Kim Broekhuizen, David Brandon Named Athletic Director, UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN, http://www.ur.umich.edu/update/archives/100105/brandon (last
visited Sep. 3, 2011) (discussing naming of David Brandon as Athletic Director).
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E. Education
The prevalence of Athletic Directors with a graduate degree
has also been on the rise over the last twenty plus years.  This is not
unexpected, as both the number and percentage of American work-
ers with college or post-graduate degrees is also rising.  By 2013-14,
80% of the Athletic Directors had at least one graduate degree.  6%
of the sample received a law degree, and another 11% had either a
Ph.D. or Ed.D.  Moreover, more than 14 % of Athletic Directors
had multiple graduate degrees.  One Athletic Director, Terry Don
Phillips of Clemson, provides an example of all of these categories.
After graduating from Arkansas with his bachelor’s degree, Phillips
obtained a J.D. from Arkansas and both a master’s degree and a
Ph.D. from Virginia Tech.296
In 1999-00, only 52% of the Athletic Directors surveyed had
received a graduate degree.  10% of the Athletic Directors with a
graduate degree had a law degree, i.e., 5% of all Division I Athletic
Directors had a law degree.  7% of Athletic Directors had multiple
graduate degrees, and 5% had a Ph.D.  Ted Leland, Stanford’s for-
mer Athletic Director, highlights several of the aforementioned cat-
egories.  After graduating with a bachelor’s degree from the
University of the Pacific, he went on to receive a master’s degree in
physical education from the same school.297  He then attended
Stanford, where he obtained a Ph.D. in education and sports psy-
chology before working his way through Athletic Director positions
at University of the Pacific and Dartmouth College before becom-
ing Athletic Director at Stanford.298  In contrast, Gene Bleymaier,
most recently of San Jose State, received a J.D. from Loyola before
embarking on a career that saw him sit as Athletic Director at
UCLA for 19 years by 1999.299
In 1989-90, 23% of Division I Athletic Directors had earned a
graduate degree.  Of those with graduate degrees, 7% (or 2% of
the total) had a law degree and 22% (5% of the total) received a
296. See Terry Don Phillips, CLEMSON TIGERS, http://www.clemsontigers
.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=205529939 (last visited Sep. 13, 2014) (indicat-
ing that some Athletic Directors receive graduate degrees, or even PhDs).
297. See Dr. Ted Leland, PACIFIC TIGERS ATHLETICS, http://www.pacifictigers
.com/genrel/leland_ted00.html (last visited Sep. 13, 2014) (providing example of
one Athletic Director that received graduate degree prior to becoming Athletic
Director).
298. See id. (discussing further academic accomplishments of Athletic Direc-
tor, D. Ted Leland).
299. See Gene Bleymaier, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY ATHLETICs (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.broncosports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=9900&ATCLID=
536787 (providing example of Athletic Director that received J.D.).
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Ph.D.  Chet Gladchuck, the Tulane Athletic Director for the 1989-
90 school year, received a master’s degree in sport administration
from UMass after graduating with a bachelor’s degree from Boston
College.300  However, many Athletic Directors did not obtain a
graduate degree in an area related to sports or education.  For ex-
ample, Doug Single received a master’s degree in political science
from Stanford prior to rising through the ranks of college athletic
administration to become SMU’s Athletic Director.301
The steady rise in education level of Athletic Directors is con-
sistent with the pattern of overall increase in educational attain-
ment in the United States, albeit on a higher level relative to the
general population.  In 2005, the census released information that
suggested roughly 27.6% of the U.S. population 25 and older re-
ceived a bachelor’s degree or higher, and 9.6% of that same popu-
lation attained a master’s degree, professional degree, or doctorate
degree.302  These numbers increased from the initial 2000 census
levels by over three percentage points and half a percentage point,
respectively.303
Education Graduate J.D. Ph.D./Ed.D. 
1989-1990 23% 2% 5%
1999-2000 52% 5% 5%
2013-2014 80% 6% 11% 
F. Age
The average age of Division I Athletic Directors has slowly in-
creased over the sample period.  It is important to note that the age
may not have been directly available for all sample Athletic Direc-
tors.  As a result, indirect methods of obtaining an estimate were
used, such as adding 22 years to the individual’s birth year to reach
300. See Chet Gladchuck, CBS INTERACTIVE, http://www.navysports.com/
genrel/gladchuk_chet00.html (last visited Sep. 13, 2014) (illustrating example of
Athletic Director that received masters degree).
301. See Bob Logan, Northwestern AD Single Resigns, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 31,
1987, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-07-31/sports/8702250865_1_nu-
northwestern-alex-agase (illustrating example of Athletic Director that received
Master’s Degree).
302. See EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY SEX: 2000, MATRICES PCT64 AND PCT65,
IN CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 4, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (2000), available at http://
factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
DEC_00_SF4_QTP20&prodType=table (illustrating percentage of Americans who
have attained higher education).
303. See id. (evidencing that numbers increased three percent between 2000
and 2005).
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the undergraduate graduation date.  In 1989-90, the average age
stood at 51.78 years.  In the sample, the oldest Athletic Director was
Bob Devaney of Nebraska at roughly 74 years of age,304 followed by
Bill Flynn of Boston College at 73.305  The youngest was Gene
Smith, currently at Ohio State and then of Eastern Michigan, who
was only 33 at the time.306
A decade later, the average age of Athletic Directors appears to
have increased a little over a full year to 53.23.  Frank Broyles was
the oldest of the sample at age 74, having been the Athletic Direc-
tor at Arkansas for a quarter century.307  The youngest was the 35-
year old Rance Pugmire at Utah State.308
Finally, in 2013-14 the average age of Athletic Directors was
52.72.  Bill Battle was the oldest Athletic Director in the sample at
the age of 73.309  Overall, there was just under a one-year increase
in the average age from 1989-90 to 2013-14.
G. Gender and Race
Diversity has long been a hot button issue in athletics at both
the professional and college levels.  The data surveyed shows that
neither gender nor ethnicity fluctuated significantly over the
twenty-year study, although both improved slightly.
The percentage of women Athletic Directors appears to have
remained roughly constant over the last ten years.  In 2013-14,
males comprised of 90% of the sample, down from 95% in the
1999-00 Athletic Director positions.  Some of the longer tenured
female Athletic Directors in 2013-14 included Sandy Barbour (10
304. See Hall of Fame Coach Bob Devany, NEBRASKA HUSKERS (July 1, 2007),
http://www.huskers.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=100&ATCLID=45 (pro-
viding information for Bob Devany, oldest university coach).
305. See Wake Today, Funeral Tuesday for Former A.D. Flynn, BOSTON COLLEGE,
June 30, 1997, http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/rvp/pubaf/archive/flynnobit.html (ev-
idencing that Bill Flynn, Athletic Director of Boston College, was second oldest
Athletic Director).
306. See Player Bio: Gene Smith, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES, http://www.ohios-
tatebuckeyes.com/genrel/smith_gene00.html (last visited Sep. 6, 2011) (evidenc-
ing that youngest Athletic Director was Ohio State’s Gene Smith).
307. See Arkansas AD Frank Broyles Will Resign at End of Year, USA TODAY, Feb.
18, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2007-02-17-broyles-resigna-
tion_x.htm (discussing Broyles’ retirement after fifty years as AD).
308. See Lucinda Dillon Kinkead, USU’s Pugmire Placed on Leave, DESERET NEWS
(Feb. 20, 2004), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/590044551/USUs-Pugmire-
placed-on-leave.html (discussing administrative leave of Utah State University’s AD
pending DUI investigation).
309. See Bill Battle, ALABAMA ATHLETICS, http://www.rolltide.com/genrel/
bill_battle_844031.html (last visited July 2, 2014) (providing information of oldest
Athletic Director in 2013-2014).
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years at Cal Berkeley),310 Jean Lenti Ponsetto (12 years at
DePaul),311 and Kathy Beauregard (17 years at Western Michi-
gan).312  Deborah Yow also has four years of experience at NC
State, although she has significant experience at St. Louis Univer-
sity (four years) and Maryland (sixteen years).313  This is, however,
a small improvement over the 1989-90 sample, when it was 99%
male.
Race has seen similarly small improvements over the last twenty
years.  In 2013-14, the percentage of white Athletic Directors
dropped from 95% to 80%.  African-Americans were the bulk of
this minority increase, comprising 13.5% of the sample (and 84%
of the minority Athletic Directors).  From 1989-90, there was no dis-
cernible change in the racial diversity of the position, when it was
also 95% white.  The only Hispanic in the sample was Rudy Davalos
of Houston.314  Gene Smith of Eastern Michigan (now at Ohio
State) was one of the few African-Americans.315
While there have been signs of increased diversity of Athletic
Directors over the last twenty years, it is still well off most popula-
tion indicators.  Whether or not the diversity of the position contin-
ues to increase at a trickle-like pace remains to be seen.
Gender and Ethnicity % Male % White % Black 
1989-1990 99% 95% N/A 
1999-2000 95% 95% 4% 
2013-2014 90% 80% 13.5% 
310. See Sandy Barbour, CAL BEARS, http://www.calbears.com/genrel/bar-
bour_sandy00.html (last visited Sep. 3, 2011) (providing example of female Ath-
letic Director).
311. See Jean Lenti Ponsetto, DEPAUL UNIVERSITY ATHLETICS, http://www
.depaulbluedemons.com/genrel/lentiponsetto_jean00.html (last visited July 2,
2014) (providing example of female Athletic Director).
312. See Kathy Beauregard, WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, http://www
.wmubroncos.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=4600&ATCLID=121351 (last
visited Sep. 3, 2011) (providing example of female Athletic Director).
313. See Deborah A. Yow, NC STATE WOLFPACK, http://www.gopack.com/
genrel/yow_deboraha.01.html (last visited Sep. 2, 2011) (providing example of fe-
male Athletic Director).
314. See College Athletics: Rudy Davalos Honored by NACDA, SAN MARCOS DAILY
RECORD, April 29, 2010, http://www.sanmarcosrecord.com/sports/x537287967/
College-Athletics-Rudy-Davalos-honored-by-NACDA (evidencing that Rudy Davalos
one of few Hispanic Athletic Directors).
315. See Player Bio: Gene Smith, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES, http://www.ohios-
tatebuckeyes.com/genrel/smith_gene00.html (last visited Sep. 6, 2011) (evidenc-
ing that Gene Smith was one of few African-American Athletic Directors).
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V. CAREER TRACKS
The data surveyed over the last twenty years shows that some
traits, such as business experience, appear to have become more
important over the years while others, such as head coaching expe-
rience have lessened.  However, there are some patterns that sug-
gest Athletic Directors are more likely to take certain career tracks
over others.
It is important to stress that these career tracks are not all-in-
clusive or designed to capture every way in which an individual has
or can become an Athletic Director.  Instead, they are “big picture”
trends taken from the hundreds of Athletic Directors over a twenty-
year period.  Each school is in a different place with a different path
envisioned for both its short and long term future, particularly
when hiring an Athletic Director.  For example, as the revenues
produced by college athletics grow, so does the importance of hav-
ing an Athletic Director who has experience in dealing with areas
such as revenue generation, cost control, and fiscal management.
It is also more likely that schools will look at candidates with strong
business or fundraising backgrounds if the university wants to begin
or continue a capital campaign.
A. Collegiate Playing Track
The twenty plus year period over which the samples were taken
show that the percentage of Athletic Directors who were college
athletes dropped from 1989-90 to 2013-14.  Nonetheless, still at
least two-thirds of the Athletic Directors in 2013-14 were athletes in
college.  The most popular sport amongst Athletic Directors was by
far football; nearly half (47%) of the Athletic Directors with college
playing experience played football. Basketball was a distant second
place, with 8% having taken the court for their alma mater.  Of
those who were athletes, 81% went on to obtain a graduate degree,
roughly the same percentage as the general Division I Athletic Di-
rector population.
It is notable that playing experience and coaching experience
seem to be linked, with 26% of Athletic Directors with playing expe-
rience also having head coaching experience.  This is unsurprising,
given the obvious link between playing a sport and coaching a sport
(particularly at a high level, such as in the FBS).  Also of note is that
at least seven of the nine female FBS Athletic Directors have col-
legiate playing experience, suggesting that the women who have en-
tered college administration, and successfully become Athletic
68
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Directors, have done so through first exposing themselves to the
process as an athlete.
However, even though many of the Athletic Directors with col-
legiate playing experience have coached, business experience is still
important on this track.  Sixty-four of the 77 Athletic Directors with
playing experience (86%) obtained some sort of business back-
ground before becoming an Athletic Director.  The majority of
those with business experience—86%316 work their way up through
the athletic department ladder and expose themselves to business
decisions along the way.  Another 18.8% of those with business ex-
perience worked in business outside the athletic department before
moving laterally to a position such as assistant or associate Athletic
Director before eventual promotion to Athletic Director.317  Finally,
12.5% moved from business outside the athletic department di-
rectly to Athletic Director.318
It is possible that candidates with student-athlete experience
are preferred because of their familiarity with the rules, structure,
and processes of the NCAA, conferences and athletic departments.
It is also possible that the potential applicants for Division I Athletic
Director positions are self-selecting.  That is, college athletes are
more likely than non-athletes to prefer a career in the college ath-
letic field.  Regardless, it appears that obtaining a graduate degree
is an important step on the path to becoming an Athletic Director
through the collegiate athlete track, with over three in every four
doing so.
B. Collegiate Coaching Track
Although the number of Athletic Directors who were college
head coaches has declined over the twenty-plus-year period, it still
represented a significant percentage of the Athletic Directors in
2013-14.  In fact, from 1989-90 to 2013-14, the number of Athletic
Directors with previous collegiate head coaching experience fell by
roughly a third.  Still, about one in every five Athletic Directors had
head coaching experience at the collegiate level in 2013-14.
Interestingly, those Athletic Directors who were part of the
coaching track in 2013-14 averaged just over 57 years of age, which
316. This is 74% of the Athletic Director population with collegiate playing
experience, or 53.8% of the total Athletic Director population.
317. This is 15.6% of the Athletic Director population with collegiate playing
experience, or 10.1% of the total Athletic Director population.
318. This is 10.4% of the Athletic Director population with collegiate playing
experience, 6.7% of the total Athletic Director population.
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is almost five years over the average of all Athletic Directors that
year.  This is not surprising for two reasons: (1) the coaching path
usually takes a little over a decade, with the average number of years
coached at 11.1 (including time as an assistant); and, (2) over two-
thirds (69%) of Athletic Directors with coaching experience had
some sort of business experience prior to becoming an Athletic Di-
rector.  Also unsurprising is that all but one of these Athletic Direc-
tors got this business experience by working in the athletic
department before eventually being promoted internally or hired
as an Athletic Director elsewhere.  In 2013-14, one Athletic Director
that obtained business experience outside the athletic department
was Terry Holland of East Carolina.319  Even he was not discon-
nected from the university setting, however, as he spent three years
as the special assistant to the president of the University of Virginia
from 2001-04.320
A number of Athletic Directors who took the coaching track
also spent some time in academia on both sides of the podium.
Four-fifths (80%) of the Athletic Directors who took the coaching
track have a graduate degree.  On the other side, at least 17%
taught a college course at one time in their career.
A recent notable example of an individual who took the coach-
ing track is Barry Alvarez at Wisconsin.  Alvarez spent 26 years
coaching collegiate football, including 15 as the head coach at Wis-
consin.321  In 2004-05, Alvarez replaced Pat Richter as the Athletic
Director and remained the football coach until 2005, when he re-
tired as a coach and began devoting all his efforts to the Athletic
Director position.322
A number of Athletic Directors (at least 27%) have also spent
time as an assistant college coach. Florida International University
Athletic Director Pete Garcia is one such example, having spent
over 11 years as an assistant coach.
319. Terry Holland Named One of the 100 Most Influential Sports Educators, EAST
CAROLINA PIRATES (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.ecupirates.com/genrel/101707aab
.html (illustrating that Terry Holland had business experience prior to becoming
Athletic Director).
320. See id. (illustrating that Terry Holland had worked as special assistant to
President prior to becoming Athletic Director).
321. See Barry Alvarez, WISCONSIN ATHLETICS, http://www.uwbadgers.com/
genrel/alvarez_barry00.html (last visited Sep. 3, 2011) (showing that Barry Alvarez
spent 26 years coaching collegiate football, 15 of which were at Wisconsin).
322. See id. (evidencing that Barry Alvarez retired as coach in 2005 to devote
efforts to Athletic Director position).
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C. Business Track
The data suggests that individuals with some sort of business
experience have become more prevalent in FBS Athletic Director-
ships over the twenty-year period from 1989-90 to 2013-14.  More
than 18 out of every 20 Athletic Directors (89.3%) had some kind
of business experience prior to being named the Athletic Director.
This career track encompasses a wide range of potential paths,
from in-house experience in the athletic department (e.g., market-
ing, ticket sales, fund raising, development, etc.), to external exper-
iences (e.g., law practice, entrepreneurial experience, finance,
etc.).  Unsurprisingly, those with business experience also had a
high rate of graduate degrees at 79%.
A vast majority (83%) of the Athletic Directors on this path in
2013-14 had business experience within the athletic department.
For example, Bill Moos spent time as an assistant and associate Ath-
letic Director and the director of development at Washington State
prior to becoming the Athletic Director at the same school.323
Other Athletic Directors moved around prior to their current posi-
tion, such as Warde Manuel at UConn, who spent seven years as
Athletic Director at Buffalo (2005-12), 10 years at Michigan (associ-
ate Athletic Director from 2000-05, assistant Athletic Director for
operations from 1998-2000, and executive staff assistant from 1996-
98) after gaining experience from Georgia Tech (assistant Athletic
Director of academic affairs and athletic advisor) and a first stint at
Michigan (coordinator of the Wade H. McCree, Jr., Incentive
Scholars Program from 1990-1993).324
Some of the most high profile recent hires have had significant
external business experience.  Dave Brandon, for example, was
chairman of the board, chief executive officer, and manager of
Domino’s Pizza prior to accepting a position as Athletic Director at
the University of Michigan.325  Pat Haden, now the Athletic Direc-
323. Washington State University Athletic Director Bill Moos, WASHINGTON STATE
COUGARS, http://www.wsucougars.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=207914978
(last visited Sep. 3, 2011) (providing example of Athletic Director with other busi-
ness experiences within university athletics).
324. See Warde Manuel, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT HUSKIES, http://www
.uconnhuskies.com/genrel/manuel_warde00.html (last visited Sep. 13, 2014)
(demonstrating an Athletic Director that moved around).
325. See Dave Brandon, MGOBLUE.COM, http://www.mgoblue.com/genrel/
brandon_dave00.html (last visited Sep. 13, 2014) (providing example of Athletic
Director with prior business experience).
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tor at USC, worked as a color commentator for CBS and NBC and
was a partner in the private equity firm Riordan, Lewis & Haden.326
There was not a significant deviation in the average age of Ath-
letic Directors who took a business track, with both those Athletic
Directors who worked their way up the athletic department and
those who went straight from an outside business to the position of
Athletic Director both averaging roughly 53 years of age.  Interest-
ingly, those who worked in external businesses and then moved lat-
erally into the position of assistant or associate Athletic Director
were slightly younger at about 51 years of age.
D. Academia
The percentage of Athletic Directors who have had experience
in academia has remained steady over the twenty-year period at
roughly 9%.  While not as prevalent as the playing, coaching, or
business tracks, the fact that the percentage has remained consis-
tent over the course of the twenty years suggests it is still a viable
path.
Those Athletic Directors who took this track were also slightly
older than the average at over 55.49 years old.  Also, 25% of the
Athletic Directors with experience in academia also had head
coaching experience at the collegiate level.  71.4% also had busi-
ness experience, all of them through the athletic department.
Examples of Athletic Directors who may be considered to have
taken a path in academia include Sheahon Zenger and David Wil-
liams III.  Zenger, the Athletic Director at the University of Kansas,
spent time as an educator while coaching and also working in the
athletic department.327  More traditionally, David Williams III is the
vice chancellor for university affairs and athletics at Vanderbilt, but
is also the general counsel and secretary for the University and a
professor of law.328
326. See Pat Haden, USC TROJANS, http://www.usctrojans.com/genrel/
haden_pat00.html (last visited Sep. 13, 2014) (providing example of Athletic Di-
rector with prior business experience).
327. See Dr. Sheahon Zenger, CBS INTERACTIVE, http://www.kuathletics.com/
staff.aspx?staff=174 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (illustrating Sheahon Zenger’s ex-
perience prior to becoming Athletic Director).
328. See David Williams III, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://
law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/faculty-detail/index.aspx?faculty_id=198 (last visited
Sep. 3, 2011) (indicating that David Williams is also Vice Chancellor and Professor
of Law, as well as Athletic Director).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The role of an Athletic Director is complicated, multi-faceted,
and extremely stressful.  Moreover, the state of college athletics is
currently in tumult, creating further confusion, work, stress, and
uncertainty for today and tomorrow’s Athletic Directors.  Neverthe-
less, the position is as desired as it is demanding.  This Article ana-
lyzed the duties and characteristics of an Athletic Director while
providing guidance to prospective Athletic Directors.
The data demonstrates that the demographics of Athletic Di-
rectors have changed dramatically over the last twenty years.  Less
coaching experience and more business experience are the primary
trends, likely due in part to the huge increases in revenues Division
I FBS athletic programs are generating.  Athletic Directors are also
more likely to have graduate degrees and past Athletic Director ex-
perience, suggesting that universities are looking for a proven track
record of success given the increasingly high stakes.  There is no
mistaking that college athletics is big business and Athletic Direc-
tors increasingly must have the skills and competencies to operate
and grow that business on behalf of their universities.
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